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ABSTRACT
JONATHAN NAIMON.  A Case Study of the First Proposed Field
Test of An Environmental Application of Biotechnology in the
United States (Under the direction of DR. FRANCES LYNN).
This paper analyzes the processes by which three levels
of government analyzed potential risks from a precedent-
setting environmental application of biotechnology, Advanced
Genetic Science's FROSTBAN product.  The research is based
on regulatory decision dockets, accounts of the case in
scientific journals and newspapers, and personal interviews
with key scientists, policy analysts, and senior decision
makers.  The 1.5 hour interviews employed both fixed choice
and open-ended questions.
Four distinct conceptions of potential hazards arose in
the AGS case: toxicity to humans, pathogenicity to plants,
ecological risks to non target species, and climate changes.
Worst case scenarios were devised in each organization to
evaluate the application.  The scientific assumptions of
these analyses differed substantially.  All three
organizations requested additional technical data from AGS.
Criteria for evaluating such data were not always prepared
before performing experiments.  Scientists believed the most
critical uncertainties related to their individual
discipline.
Many of the uncertainties identified in the AGS case
could not be unambiguously resolved by provision of more
data.  A framework for interpreting information on potential
ecological hazards of introduced organisms is not available
from any one of the disciplines that contributed to the AGS
review.  Future risk analyses could be improved by
developing explicit ecological goals and criteria for data
interpretation.  In the meantime, biological controls should
be required for tests of engineered microorganisms to reduce
many identified uncertainties.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
This technical paper critically examines the risk
assessment practices used by the U.S. EPA, California
Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA), and Monterey
County to analyze a proposal to conduct a small scale field
test of a genetically engineered microbial product.  The
proposed test involved spray application of a mist of two
genetically engineered bacteria Pseudomonas syringae and
Pseudomonas fluorescens on strawberry plants to retard frost
formation.  Advanced Genetic Sciences Inc. (AGS) planned to
market a product based on engineered Pseudomonads throughout
the United States as a cost effective and ecologically sound
method of reducing frost damage.
This report analyzes:
1. the nature of the scientific issues and uncertainties
identified in the initial government risk analyses of a
proposed field test of an engineered microorganism by
Advanced Genetic Sciences Inc. (AGS), and
2. the procedures used by three public organizations to
resolve the scientific and technical uncertainties and
make decisions on the field test proposal.
On the basis of an analysis of the issues that arose in
evaluation of this precedent setting case, some
recommendations to facilitate risk management of future
environmental biotechnology applications are presented.
Identifying and managing risks from proposed
environmental applications of biotechnology is important for
a number of reasons.  Biotechnology is expected to become an
engine of sustained economic growth in the USA. (OTA, 1981)
Its ability to spur productivity improvements in a diverse
range of outdoor human activities will be limited if hazards
cannot be identified and controlled.  Post World War II
experience with organic pesticides, nuclear power, and other
technologies suggests to many observers that unanticipated,
detrimental effects on the environment and some human
activities are common traits of powerful new technologies
such as biotechnology. (Alexander, 1985)
A.  Scientific Issues
There has been a polarized debate in scientific journals
as to whether or not there is a need for specialized
analysis of risks arising from environmental applications of
biotechnology.  Authors such as geneticist Winston Brill
have argued that genetic engineering products are not likely
to pose different classes of risk than existing agricultural
products.  He believes that genetically engineered products
should be expected to pose less severe ecological risks than
natural organisms introduced into new environments because
the engineered organisms are not optimized for terrestrial
environments by evolutionary processes. (Brill, 1985)
Ecologists such as Frances Sharpless (1987) have argued that
the adaptation of genetically engineered organisms to new
environments is unpredictable and has the potential to
create substantial new risks to the viability of certain
ecosystem processes and members.  Among potential
environmental products, genetically engineered
microorganisms have generated more controversy than
genetically engineered plants or animals.  (Sharpless, 1987)
While there is no accepted scientific evidence that
genetically engineered microorganisms (GEMs) as an entire
class are dangerous, there are some scientific reasons for
expecting different types of uncertainties with
environmental applications of biotechnology than in
environmental chemical applications.  For example, viable
microbes have the ability to reproduce and multiply rapidly
in favorable environments.  Industrial chemicals can never
increase in quantity after environmental release.
Exogenously introduced organisms can colonize new habitats,
displace existing organisms, and thus may be able to affect
underlying ecological processes such as nutrient cycling,
animal behavior, and evolution.  Non living chemical
mixtures typically affect fewer environmental biochemical
processes and cannot act as new competitors for resources in
the environment.  More than genetically engineered plants
and animals, GEMs have the ability to transfer their genetic
material to naturally occurring organisms and receive DNA
from organisms in the target environment.  This capability
can lead to changes in the functions that novel and natural
organisms play in different ecosystems over time.  Even if
no genetic material is exchanged, the functional
capabilities of an introduced organism can be expected to
change as the organism adapts to its environment over the
course of many generations.  For these reasons, risk
assessment of environmental biotechnology applications
should involve different issues than risk assessments of
chemicals used in the environment.
Environmental applications of genetically engineered
organisms will also pose different scientific and technical
questions for risk management than indoor biotechnology
applications.  Because of the variability and diversity of
natural ecosystems, there are a wider number of
opportunities for offsite transport by wind, insects,
animals, and people.  Technical control of environmental
applications is therefore much more difficult.  Perhaps most
importantly, there is much less information available on the
relevant parameters of multiorganism environmental systems
than the single organism systems targeted in biomedical and
chemical production applications.  Thus, the task of
assessing potential scientific risks from AGS proposed field
test could be expected to involve different scientific
issues, different types of evidence, and different
scientific uncertainties than those associated with either
outdoor chemical applications or indoor biotechnology
applications.  (Gillette, 1986)
In addition to these theoretical questions about the
safety of environmental applications of biotechnology,
practical limitations on available information make
evaluation of potential risks difficult.  Because deliberate
environmental dispersal of GEMs has not been permitted by
most developed countries at the time of the proposed AGS
field test, there is only scanty, anecdotal data available
on the behavior of a few via±)le, engineered organisms in
natural environments.
The limits of existing disciplines may contribute to the
difficulty in evaluating potential effects from applications
of biotechnology.  Environmental applications of
biotechnology represent a hybrid field requiring inputs from
molecular biology, cell biology, plant pathology, public
health, microbial ecology, and systems ecology.  During the
last ten years, interaction between many of these fields has
been infrequent if at all.  Research activity is more
concentrated in previously established disciplines with
stable support.  Few scientists have developed theories or
conducted experiments linking molecular modifications and
changes in ecosystem dynajnics or function.
Despite these technical differences between
environmental biotechnology applications and environmental
chemical applications, statutes created for non living
chemicals were used as the basis for regulation of the first
genetically engineered products intended for environmental
release.  Under the "Coordinated Framework for Regulating
Biotechnology" published in the Federal Register (Office of
Science and Technology Policy, 1984), the AGS field test was
regulated under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).  FIFRA was written in 1946, before
DNA was even isolated, to limit acute health risks from
ineffective and dangerous pesticides.  While there is more
diversity in state policies concerning environmental
biotechnology , California also treated the AGS product as a
new pesticide. (Jones, 1986) Laws created to regulate less
subtle agricultural products could be expected to miss
certain new effects of biotechnology products.
B.  Information Processing by Regulatory Organizations
There are many lenses through which to view scientific
policy analyses like the evaluation of the FROSTBAN field
test.  A popular approach to policy analysis has been to
divide the process into a series of steps akin to scientific
research. (Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1976) According to this
model, public organizations need to undertake the following
activities in doing policy analysis:  problem definition,
information research, information analysis, information
preservation, and decision-making.  A premise of this policy
analysis model is that the information obtained and analyzed
by an organization is critical to that organization's
decision.  Some alternative views of policy analysis focus
on political pressures agencies face and the inadequacy of
certain disciplines to resolve complex policy issues.
(Schrader-Frechette, 1980)
Perhaps because problem definition often has political
inputs, this phase has received the least systematic
treatment of these imputed phases.  The literature suggests
that it is crucial to determining the nature of subsequent
activities including decision-making.  Many authors suggest
that problems be defined as broadly as possible.  (Stokey
and Zeckhauser, 1976)
The literature on information acquisition analyzes
activities in terms of the actors involved, the content
acquired, sources of the information, and the external
constraints on the search process.  In novel situations
private sector research and development organization
managers rely on individual "information stars" to tap
extra-organizational information sources to support
decisionmaking.  (Fisher, 1984) When there is a high level
of technical uncertainty, senior management in government
research and development organizations use unstructured
channels like telephone conversations that permit immediate
feedback rather than formal sources like reference texts or
databases. (Holland, 1984) The literature suggests that two
distinct classes of information, technical and political,
are acquired in the search phase of the analysis process.
Non technical information includes:
1.  the legal rules and regulations constraining its policy
choices.
2. the past activities of the agency and its internal
resources,
3. the preferences of important actors within the agency,
its constituency groups, other agencies, and its
executive, legislative, and judicial sovereigns, and
4. the probable reactions of important political actors to
the substantive consequences of each policy alternative.
(Sabatier,1978)
While scientific and technical information may seem less
uncertain than political information, four types of
technical uncertainty have been identified in the literature
on regulatory activities: inadequate data, conflicting data,
different interpretations of the same information, and
uncertainty resulting from different models.  (McLaughlin,
1987)  The capacity of organizations and individual analysts
to utilize new information is apparently reduced in crisis
conditions.  In crisis situations, managers tend to display
a lower tolerance for ambiguities like the uncertainties
mentioned above and a cognitive rigidity to alternative
policies that have not been deployed before. (McLaughlin,
1987)  The AGS case, since it developed over the course of a
year, cannot be considered a crisis .  However, the rapid
technological change that precipitated the regulatory
questions reduced the lead time available to government
officials and could indirectly contribute to a crisis
management syndrome.  (Fischer, 1986)
C. study Hypotheses
On the basis of the scientific questions raised by the
advent of open environment applications of genetic
engineering and the literature on processing of technical
information by regulatory organizations, we developed a few
working hypotheses to guide our research.  These hypotheses
were:
1. the non routine nature of the scientific questions that
arose would compel each organization to use non routine
decisionmaking processes.  These processes could be expected
to make extensive use of information sources that provide
instant feedback and information about political factors.
2. the limits of existing disciplines would prevent
organizations from fully evaluating scientific questions
about the impact(s) of the introduction of GEMs into a
natural environment.  Organizations that devised procedures
to include individuals with diverse backgrounds would be
better equipped to evaluate potential impacts than
organizations that employed routine processes and regular
personnel used to traditional environmental problems.
D. Methods
The Advanced Genetic Sciences 1985 proposal to field
test Pseudomonas syringae and Pseudomonas fluorescens was
selected as a case study because it was the first proposal
to deliberately release a genetically engineered
microorganism analyzed by EPA after responsibility for
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regulating environmental applications of biotechnology was
shifted to EPA from the National Institutes of Health.  As
the first case of its type considered, the aforementioned
scientific issues seemed likely to be explicitly treated in
the process of making decisions on the proposal.  We
believed that analysis of the handling of the case could
provide insight into the type of regulatory policy issues
that are likely to recur in future evaluations of
environmental products that utilize biotechnology.
The regulatory and legal background of the case was
obtained by analyzing relevant notices in the Federal
Register.  A Freedom of Information Act request was filed
with EPA in order to obtain the AGS Experimental Use Permit
application, supporting AGS scientific data and
correspondence, transcripts of the special Subpanel of the
EPA FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel convened to evaluate
this application, comments of individual subpanel members on
the test proposal, and comments of other agencies.
Congressional hearing records were used to identify
additional policy issues.  Newspaper articles were used to
identify key actors in California's and Monterey County's
regulation of the AGS proposal.  Public interest
organizations were contacted by phone to obtain copies of
lawsuits and correspondence with agency officials.  All of
these documents were analyzed to identify key individuals
who were involved in the analysis of the case and who were
responsible for regulatory decisions made by the US EPA, the
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California Department of Food and Agriculture, and Monterey
County.  Additional documents used or prepared in each
organization's decision-making processes were obtained
during the in person interviews.  These documents helped
provide a basis for understanding the evolution of the
consensus technical opinions in each organization.
AGS scientific personnel were asked to participate in
this study.  AGS representatives declined because of
concurrent negotiations with EPA's Office of Special Counsel
at the time of the interviews.  (EPA Office of Compliance
Enforcement, 1986) Dr. Stephen Lindow, the University of
California at Berkeley scientist who elaborated the concept
of a bacterial frost damage protection system, and Mr.
Edward Lee Rogers, Foundation for Economic Trends legal
counsel, were also interviewed in person to obtain
historical information about issues surrounding the proposed
field test.
One and a half hour in person interviews were conducted
with both analysts and senior decision-makers to compare the
types of information that were important to each in the
decision-making process.  The interviews were structured
using the UNC Institute for Environmental Studies/School of
Business Administration NSF project interview guide.  This
guide was designed to probe ways in which scientific and
technical information is processed by federal agencies in
non-routine situations.  Interviewees were asked questions
to examine the potential importance of individual and work
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unit disciplinary background, time constraints, legal
constraints, organizational uncertainties, and other
suggested influences on the processes of problem
formulation, information search behavior, information
analysis, and decision-making. (Lynn, 1986)  Interviewees
were asked to characterize both the nature and sources of
scientific uncertainty, and the quality of different types
of information that were utilized in their analysis of the
AGS proposal.  The NSF interview guide used is given in
Appendix 1.
In the next chapter, EPA's handling of the AGS proposal
to field test genetically engineered bacteria is described.
Readers interested in the technical basis for the AGS
FROSTBAN product are referred to Appendix II, "Technical
Background for the AGS Case."
II.  DESCRIPTION OF RISK ASSESSMENT BY EPA
This chapter examines the process by which EPA defined
the issues, acquired, analyzed, and presented scientific
information to carry out its regulatory responsibility for
an environmental biotechnology application.  Background
information on Advanced Genetic Sciences (AGS) and the
policies that governed the review process are given in
section A.  The processes by which scientific information
was obtained are described in Section B, Section C describes
EPA's analysis of the scientific information it acquired.
Section D discusses the way that scientific information was
presented within EPA in the decision meiking process.  The
utility of the information acquisition and analysis process
EPA used is evaluated in Section E.
A. Background
1.  AGS Inc.
Advanced Genetic Sciences Inc. (AGS) is a medium sized
biotechnology firm founded in 1980.  AGS's focus is on
products for the agricultural production and food processing
markets.  Like many biotechnology startup firms,
international chemical companies are now major minority
shareholders.  Rohm © Haas, has a 12% of the public stock.
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and Hillshoeg AB of Sweden owns 16% of AGS.  ACS has
manufacturing facilities in Canada and Sweden.  Its American
scientific and management operations are now based in
Oakland, California in a building leased from the University
of California at Berkeley. (Advanced Genetic Sciences, 1985)
In 1981, while AGS was based in Greenwich, Connecticut.
Dr. Steven Lindow, then at the University of Wisconsin
Department of Plant Pathology, approached AGS with an idea
for a bacterial snowmaking product utilizing INA+ (Ice
Nucleation Active) P. syringae.  This product concept has
been refined by AGS and a dehydrated concentrate of
irradiated INA+ P. syringae is now marketed as SNOWMAX to
ski resorts to increase the efficiency of artificial
snowmaking at near freezing temperatures.  (Harris, 1985)
In 1982, AGS acquired an exclusive license from the
University of California to commercially develop, produce,
and market a genetically engineered (Ice Nucleation
Inactive) INA- bacterial products to reduce agricultural
frost damage.  AGS retained Dr. Steven Lindow, who first
proposed using INA- bacteria to retard frost formation and
tissue damage on plant leaves, as a consultant.  While the
terms of individual licensing agreements are confidential,
most University of California technology license agreements
provide that 50% of all royalties the school receives from
licensees is given to the inventor. (Strom, 1987)
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2.  Federal Policy
In 1982 Dr. Lindow and Dr. Panopoulos (both of the
University of California at Berkeley) requested permission
from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to perform
outdoor experiments to test the efficacy of this new frost
control technology in the field.  At this time, the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had
jurisdiction over all recombinant DNA experiments in which
researchers were supported by civilian federal agencies.
This request was approved in a 7-5 vote (with two
abstentions) by the NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee
(RAC).  However, HHS and NIH withheld approval because of
concerns raised in the RAC about: 1) the anticipated effects
of tagging Pseudomonas strains with antibiotic resistance,
and 2) potential climatic effects from non ice nucleating
(INA-) genetically engineered microorganisms (GEMs)
displacing INA+ bacteria that may play a role in ice
nucleation in rainclouds.  NIH invited the scientists to
reapply and provide information to allay these two RAC
concerns.  (Milewski, 1983)
In early 1983 the two Berkeley professors resubmitted a
revised application with additional information on the
strains they planned to use, and arguments rebutting some of
the RAC's concerns.  On April 11, 1983 the NIH RAC approved
this application 19-0.  On June 1, 1983, following approval
by the US Department of Agriculture Recombinant DNA
Committee, NIH granted Drs. Panopoulos and Lindow permission
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to proceed with the field test at a single site, the
University of California Field Station at Tulelake,
California. (Milewski, 1983)  Immediately thereafter, a
public interest group, the Foundation for Economic Trends
(FET) sued in the DC Federal Court to block the test on the
basis that an adequate environmental impact statement for
the risks accruing from the proposed experiment was not
performed.  District Court Judge John Sirica agreed with the
suit and issued an injunction blocking the proposed field
test until an adequate environmental impact statement,
filling the National Environmental Policy Act's substantive
requirements, was made.  (Foundation on Economic Trends v.
Heckler, 1984)
The novel scientific nature of the regulatory decision
on proposed field tests of engineered bacterial frost
control strains was compounded by a shifting legal and
regulatory framework for outdoor tests of engineered
organisms.  In late 1983 the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP) formed a Biotechnology
Coordinating Committee (BSCC) to analyze regulatory issues
associated with commercialization of biotechnology.  This
committee had representation from the National Science
Foundation, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and
the EPA.  In 1984, this committee suggested that EPA be
given lead responsibility for regulation of bacterial
biotechnology products deployed in the open environment and
USDA be given lead responsibility for regulation of animal
17
and plant biotechnology products.  While EPA and USDA did
not have NIH's experience as a major patron of modern
biotechnology, their regulatory actions are interpreted by
courts as providing the equivalent of the required National
Environmental Policy Act environmental impact review.  This
proposal was implemented by courts in an Executive Order on
the regulation of biotechnology products published in the
Federal Register.  (Office of Science and Technology Policy,
1984)
EPA has legal authority to regulate genetically
engineered microorganisms (GEMs) under either the Toxic
Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA) or the Federal
Insecticide Rodenticide and Fungicide Act of 1946.  Shortly
after the Federal Register notice was published EPA
Associate Counsel Abrahmson suggested that FIFRA was
preferable for GEMs because of the similarities between
conventionally obtained microbial pesticides and genetically
engineered microbial products.  Thirty one microbial
pesticides were already registered for use in the U.S. in
1984. (Abrahmson, 1984)
In November 1984, AGS field engineer Steven Cull sent a
letter to EPA indicating AGS's intent to conduct outdoor
experiments with two genetically engineered strains of
Pseudomonas.  EPA Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and
Toxic Programs Jack Moore determined that the proposal would
be regulated under FIFRA.
The rationale for considering AGS' genetically
engineered INA- bacterial preparation to reduce frost
formation (FROSTBAN) as a pesticide is explained in a
communications packet EPA released in November 1986.  It
states,
"Under FIFRA, a pesticide is defined as any
substance or mixture of substances intended for
preventing, destroying, repelling or mitigating
any pest.  In this instance, the INA+ bacteria
are the pests because they nucleate frost that
in turn destroys or harms crops, and the INA-
products are pesticides because they are
intended to displace the INA+ bacteria and
prevent or mitigate the harm (frost) caused by
them.
(EPA Office of Public Information, 1986)
FIFRA classifies new product proposals by the size
of proposed field tests.  EPA doesn't require an
Experimental Use Permit (EUP) for all pesticide tests
involving less than four acres.  In 1984, EPA
published an Interim Rule which gave it authority to
require an EUP for small scale field tests of products
that included genetically engineered organisms such as
AGS' FROSTBAN.
The process by which different units in EPA
contributed to the formulation of its scientific
position on the AGS proposal is outlined in Table 1.
The SAP is an acronym for EPA's FIFRA Scientific
Advisory Panel, a panel of outside scientists selected
to review problematic scientific questions that arise
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under FIFRA.  FDA is the acronym for the Food and Drug
Administration.  USDA is the acronym for the
Department of Agriculture.
TABLE  1
EPA ASSESSMENT PROCESS  TOR AGS APPLICATTON
Office of Pesticide Program Review
• E.Tviranrvental Fate
• Ecological Effects
• Human Health
ͣ•    Product Analysis
I
PrelL-ninary Scientific Position
Intra Agency REview Offices
• Toxic Substances
• Research and Development
• Policy Plarjiirq and Evaluation
• General Counsel
p ' ͣ" ͣͣͣ" ͣͣ'  ͣ                        —
SAP Subpanel Review
• Microbiologist
• Microbial Ecologist ,^
j   • Soil Microbiologist Ni^^
• Meteorologist
• Plant Pathologist
j   • Carmjnity Eoologist
Inter Agency Review
Public Comment
i
Fiivil Scientific Position
20
The Office of Pesticide Prograjns (OPP) Review was
delegated to the Hazard Evaluation Division.  This
division is principally responsible for assessing
health and environmental risks from new chemicals.  It
was responsible for considering environmental fate,
ecological effects, human health, and other potential
impacts of the AGS product.
The subsequent review by the USDA, NIH, FDA and
the Scientific Advisory Panel Subpanel is not required
by FIFRA for regular EUPs.  The additional input was
required to improve the public credibility and legal
defensibility of EPA's scientific review of the AGS
product.
Assistant Administrator Moore said.
"We knew that (Federal Judge) John Sirica found
the NIH process not consistent with NEPA
(National Environmental Policy Act)...  The
perception of credibility of the EPA process is
essential.  It seemed unlikely that the agency
would have enough expertise on hand to deal with
the AGS request.  Therefore, we evolved a
process with external peer review of EPA
judgements.  We used the SAP (FIFRA Scientific
Advisory Panel) subpanel approach because the
SAP is legally mandated to look at scientific
questions related to FIFRA registrants, and the
FIFRA SAP did not have any expertise in
climatology." (Moore, 1986)
The SAP subpanel was chaired by Dr. Wendell Kilgore, a
member of the regular FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel and an
environmental toxicologist from the University of California
at Davis.  The other members of the special subpanel created
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for the AGS Case were: Dr. Susan Hirano (University of
Wisconsin, microbial ecologist), Dr. Robert Colwell
(University of California at Berkeley, zoologist and
evolutionary biologist). Dr. Martin Alexander (Cornell
University, soil scientist, microbial ecologist) Dr. Randy
Borys, (Colorado State University, meteorologist), and Dr.
James Tiedje (Michigan State University, soil scientist and
microbiologist).
Dr.Moore suggested that the
"SAP (Subpanel) would not just respond to
questions identified by EPA staff but also be
able to look at the raw data themselves and
draw their own conclusions.  Thus, the SAP
subpanel could function as an educational tool
for EPA (in the area of impacts of release of
genetically engineered organisms) and provide
the important imprimateur of scientific rigor
on EPAs first case of a modified (genetically
engineered) pesticide."
(Moore, 1986)
Nonetheless, EPA's Hazard Evaluation Division (HED) was
responsible for initially defining the scope of the
analysis.  Within HED, Fred Betz, an environmental engineer
on the Science Integration Staff, was responsible for
operationalizing EPA's policies on GEMs, managing the
scientific review, and drafting consensus scientific
positions.
fl
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B.  Search
HED's first task was to determine whether EPA should
require an EUP for AGS.  Under the interim FIFRA policy, the
statutory time frame for this decision was 90 days.  Betz
delegated the initial review of the scientific issues to
ecologist Zigfridas Viatuzis, toxicologist Reto Engler, in
the HED Human Health Effects Branch, chemical engineer
Herbert Manning, in the HED Exposure Assessment Branch, and
chemist William Hazel in the HED Product Residue Chemistry
Branch.
These HED analysts began by carefully reading the formal
AGS proposal and NIH RAG review of a similar experiment
proposed by Lindow and Papadopolous.  Second, the EPA
scientific analysts had phone conversations with AGS
scientific personnel.  Written records of phone
conversations were maintained for incorporation into HED
records.  Face to face meetings with AGS scientific
management were held to clarify EPA's regulatory
requirements rather than to answer scientific questions.
Literature searches on naturally occurring P. syringae and
P. fluorescens were also conducted by the EPA scientific
analysts; however, the scientific information these searches
yielded was not considered very useful.
The four HED reviewers submitted their initial,
confidential analyses of the AGS test proposal to Betz
within 30 days.  These analyses apparently addressed two
types of questions:
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1. could the engineered bacteria persist in the natural
environment?
2. could they cause any detrimental effects to humans,
plants, or the weather?
The preliminary consensus was that it is possible both for
the organisms to persist and to contribute to some adverse
effects.
Mr. Betz sought to fill gaps in the information provided
by his reviewers by undertaking a subsequent information
search.  In addition to using many of the same sources as
the staff reviewers, Betz called additional scientific
experts outside the EPA and AGS.  Mr. Betz commented that
while discussions with experts are useful for finding
answers to specific questions he had, the scientific
literature may be more useful because relevant articles can
be more easily cited in subsequent decision support
documents.  (Betz, 1986)
C.  Analysis
1. Worst Case Scenario
Using the initial confidential HED analyses and the
information from his search, Mr. Betz devised a technically
plausible worst case scenario for evaluation.  First, the
microbes are borne off site by water, wind or insects;
second, the GEMs survive on related plants, multiply, third;
the GEMs exclusively colonize plants in a nearby off site
area, fourth, the GEMs are dispersed into the air, where
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fifth, the INA- GEMs depress the rate of formation of ice
droplets in clouds.  This in turn could lead to an adverse
effect "branch": changes in precipitation patterns in areas
adjoining the test site(s).
The second "branch" of HED's qualitative adverse
consequence tree concerned pathogenesis of commercial plant
relatives of the strawberries on which the GEM would be
applied.  In this branch, the GEM would establish itself on
neighboring fields and potentially cause a pathogenic
infection in potential plant hosts.  Like the precipitation
modification possibility, this "branch" could only occur if
the first contingency in the scenario occurred: INA- GEMs
competing with naturally occurring INA+ bacteria and
colonizing plants off site.
2.  Information Exchange
On the basis of the hazards defined in this qualitative
preliminary analysis, Mr. Betz determined that an
Experimental Use Permit (EUP) should be required to conduct
the test.  On February 1, 1985 EPAs Office of Pesticide
Programs (OPP) sent a letter to AGS advising that it had
decided to require an EUP for the proposed test to resolve
uncertainties that were identified by HED staff, and the
public.  In this letter. Office of Pesticide Progreims
Director Steven Shatzow formally requested AGS to submit
additional experimental information to resolve many of the
questions HED staff had.
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Determining what information was needed to resolve the
scientific questions it had was HED's second principal task.
On February 10, 1985 EPA HED staff met with AGS scientific
management to discuss experimental strategies to meet the
identified concerns.  AGS was given responsibility for
devising experiments to satisfy EPA's general concerns.  EPA
indicated that the design and conduct of the AGS experiments
would not be closely monitored.  To analyze the likelihood
of the two scenario branches described above, and meet
separate FIFRA EUP information requirements, HED requested
AGS to supply a wide range of scientific and technical
information.  Table 2 shows a sample of the types of
information EPA asked AGS to supply.
Table 2
Scientific and Technical Information Requested by EPA
to Evaluate the AGS EUP
- methods used to construct the INA- GEM
- purity of the INA- GEM preparation
- colonizing ability of Ice Nucleating Minus strains
(INA-)
- genetic and biochemical characteristics of INA- P.
syringae
- parental strain pathogenicity to crops and nativeplants (grown in the area of the proposed test site)
- methods for detection of INA- GEMS
- survival rates of INA- GEMS
- growth rates of INA- GEMS
- temperature range of INA- GEM relative to the
parental strains
- site location and nearby crops
- plans for detecting possible off-site
dissemination."
(Betz, 1985)
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In April and June 1985, AGS submitted approximately 300
pages of results from experiments they had conducted and a
footnoted narrative concerning the competitiveness issue.
The bulk of AGS's EUP support materials covered three
issues:
** toxicology of P. syringae and P. fluorescens
** pathogenicity of the organisms for different plants, and
** role of P. syringae effects on rainfall patterns
EPA staff did not use any formal techniques (e.g.,
statistical methods, sensitivity analysis, decision
analysis) to analyze the voluminous data AGS supplied.
Because experimental conditions were not uniformally
supplied by AGS, EPA asked AGS for some specific protocols.
On the basis of this information and extensive
discussions within HED, Mr. Betz drafted a preliminary
scientific position based on information at hand and the
potential risks from the test HED identified. When
fundajnental interpretative questions arose, Mr. Betz
requested comments from the special SAP subpanel members at
their quarterly meetings.  SAP subpanel members based their
comments on the entire AGS data package.  A few additional
experiments were requested by SAP Subpanel members.  HED
transmitted these requests to AGS.  AGS executed some of new
plant pathogenicity tests.  It did not do any additional
experiments suggested by the Subpanel after September, 1985.
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EPA encountered varied uncertainties in evaluating the
information AGS provided.  Two questions that were pivotal
to EPA's worst case scenario are the competitive fitness of
FROSTBAN vis a vis native INA microflora and the role of P.
syringae in atmospheric precipitation processes.  The nature
of the uncertainties EPA faced are illustrated by EPA's
treatment of these two scientific issues.
3.  Competitiveness
In its initial application, AGS argued that the
engineered INA- mutants would tend to be less evolutionary
fit than naturally occurring microflora and therefore would
not spread off site.  EPA staff, with the advice of the SAP
Subpanel, requested that AGS do experiments on young
strawberry and other plants, pitting a mixture of the wild
type INA+ and NA~ bacteria with the purely INA- FROSTBAN
GEMs.  The results of the experiment showed that the
concentration of GEMs that colonized young, bacteria-free
plants depended on the relative concentrations of INA- GEMs
and INA+ bacteria that were applied initially.  The wild
type INA+ P. syringae did not reproduce more actively than
the GEMs, nor did the GEMs outcompete the INA+ P. syringae
on the experimental plants.  (Advanced Genetic Sciences
Experimental Use Permit application and support data, 1985)
This result could be interpreted in divergent ways.  It
could indicate that the AGS contention that GEMs were
inherently less fit than wild type plants was erroneous.  It
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could reflect the similarity of the GEM to the wild type
microbe, buttressing the AGS contention that genetically
engineered FROSTBAN behaved identically to the parental
microbes.  The experiment itself could be criticized as
irrelevant because the greenhouse test system didn't reflect
fluctuations of moisture, temperature, and light that have
been reported to dramatically effect colonization behavior
of the parental strains.  (Gross, 1984)
Adding complexity to AGS' greenhouse test system would
not guarantee that natural ecosystem behavior would be well
modeled. If the AGS test data is indicative of the behavior
of INA- GEMs in field conditions, one could deduce that
displacement of INA organisms on uncolonized vegetation
depends primarily on the concentration sprayed.  This is
consistent with an extrapolation that spraying a 100% INA
P. syringae preparation on a plot of uncolonized vegetation
would result in substantial displacement of natural INA
populations.  This data is also consistent with an
extrapolation that INA~ GEMs are unlikely to displace INA
P. syringae if a low concentration of FROSTBAN is sprayed on
areas with normal concentrations of native INA bacteria.
HED did not develop a testable standard by which to
evaluate the competitive fitness experiments before they
received the information.  Faced with ambiguous data that
could be interpreted in divergent ways, HED apparently used
the following implicit criterion for evaluating the
experiment:
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"If the INA GEM displaces the native INA
bacteria to th^ extent that there are nofunctional INA bacteria, adverse effects can
ensue.
(Betz, 1985)
Embedded in this criterion is a concept of ecological
functioning depending on a threshold level of INA organisms
present.  Alternatively, intact ecosystem function could
depend on the percentage of INA bacteria available in a
system.  No information was presented by AGS to suggest the
existence of thresholds for ecological functioning.
Ecological function were not explicitly defined in the
analysis.
It seems that the ecological function framework for
interpreting the competitive fitness data was based on
toxicology concepts or regulatory needs, rather than
ecological data or theory.  Use of alternative assumptions
with the same data could have yielded a different
interpretation of the AGS competitive fitness experiments.
4.  Weather
As early as 1974, scientists suggested that ice
nucleation could be induced by P. syringae.  (Maki, 1974)
By 1978, Lindow established that INA"^ P. syringae were
present in a wide variety of agricultural crops and could
provide nucleation sites to initiate frost damage.  Maki and
Willoughby extended this notion to atmospheric processes in
an article "Bacteria as biogenic sources of freezing
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Nuclei." (Maki, 1978)  Since 1982 Dr. Russell Schnell has
amplified the possibility that INA+ bacteria could be
instrumental to natural atmospheric droplet formation in
popular science magazines as well as in scientific journals.
(Schnell, 1983, 1984) Dr. Schnell is consultant to the
National Ocean and Atmosphere Administration (NOAA).  His
stated views on potential changes in precipitation from
widespread application of INA~ P. syringae were a lynchpin
in the FET's successful suit against the Department of
Health and Human Services.
EPA staff contacted Schnell by phone to obtain his view
on the AGS proposed EUP test.His reply suggested that there
was no substantial risk of climatic modification from AGS'
proposed test because of its small size (0.2 acres). He
remained concerned about the potential impact of a wide
scale commercial program to reduce INA P. syringae on
agricultural plants.  Schnell discussed his scientific
position in a Science article, "EPA Approves Field Test of
Altered Microbes."
"There is no proof that decreasing the
population of (unaltered P. Syringae) on plants
affects precipitation.  There is substantial
circumstantial evidence that such a relationship
might exist, but the science "is very loose and
very shaky right now." Schnell said that he has
"no concern' about this particular experiment
given its small size.  "What concerns me is
spraying hundreds of square mile plots.  We need
to do some better modeling." (Schnell, 1985)
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One reason Schnell may have suggested more modeling of
precipitation processes could be his professional
orientation as an atmospheric scientist.  Another is the
present unavailability of an instrument that can reliably
detect small ice nuclei in clouds.
Schnell's proposal that modeling be done as a surrogate
for experimentation to supply a theoretical answer runs
contrary to time-honored experimentalist traditions in
biological and physical sciences.  Dr.Lindow, who also
speculated on possible role of P. syringae in atmospheric
precipitation formation, criticizes Schnell's concern
because no experimental research has been done to support
it.  Lindow suggested that NOAA could try sajnpling in the.
atmosphere if there was sufficient scientific interest in
the question of whether P. syringae were quantitatively
involved in atmospheric ice nucleation and raindrop
formation.  (Lindow, 1986)
Rather than try to resolve the controversy on the
necessity for experimental evidence to establish the role of
bacteria in a physical process, EPA HED confined its
attention to the question of risks of climate modification
from the proposed 0.2 acre test.  EPA did not request
additional scientific data from ACS on this subject, only
additional opinions from SAP Subpanel meteorologist Randolph
Borys.
The use of sources of scientific information not subject
to peer review surfaced briefly in EPA's consideration of
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the AGS EUP. The FET had used AGS marketing publications and
articles from popular publications such as Science News in
its comments on the AGS EUP. AGS had already released
SNOWMAX, a bacterial concentrate of conventionally selected
INA + P. syringae sold to improve the efficiency with which
artificial snow is made.  AGS 1984 Annual Report states
"SNOMAX works because the bacteritim from which
it is made, Pseudomonas syringae, is an
extremely effective nucleator of ice crystal
formation.  When SNOMAX is added, water changes
from the liquid to solid state more rapidly and
at higher temperatures than non-nucleated water,
(AGS, 1984)
It is ironic that the marketing literature for SNOMAX
provides circumstantial supportive evidence for the FET's
scientific contention that P. syringae can play an important
role in ice crystal and raindrop formation in natural
atmospheric settings.
EPA HED did not consider SNOMAX's properties as
described in AGS' annual report to be as useful a source as
the solicited opinions of Schnell and Borys.  From the
analysis of the weather issue, EPA concluded that there is
no evidence that links potential decreases in terrestrial
INAP+ P. syringae concentrations with decreases in natural
rainfall.  While inconclusive, the evidence from AGS'
marketing literature suggests the plausibility of changes in
atmospheric ice nucleation activity if ambient
concentrations of INA+ bacteria are altered substantially.
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D. Presentation
The preliminary HED analysts' reviews were done on FIFRA
pesticide registration review forms.  The composite
scientific positions prepared by Betz were not based on
standard EPA reporting formats, but organized around the
worst case scenario.  The comments from other offices in EPA
and other agencies were in the form of half page letters,
generally indicating support for HED's position.
In July 1985, EPA requested public comments on the AGS
EUP in the Federal Register.  Like other agencies, EPA had
to note and respond to comments it received before arriving
at its final decision.  The views of groups holding
alternative opinions in the issues in HED's scientific
analysis (e.g. FET) were included in the form of questions
directed to the specific SAP Subpanel and AGS.
E. Decision Process
In September, OPP Director Steven Shatzow asked the SAP
to review the HED's scientific position on the case.  Each
SAP member submitted an independent written review of the
HED position and the adequacy of AGS' supporting materials
to the Subpanel chairman or Phillip Grey, the SAP Executive
Director.
The tone of the reviews differed substantially between
different reviewers.  James Tiede offered praise for AGS and
HED's analysis.  Martin Alexander said that sections of the
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AGS EUP "showed an inadequate understanding of ecology."
(Alexander, 1985).
Entomologist Robert Colwell described additional
concerns that had not been dealt with:  potential dispersal
by honeybees, and potential pathogenicity to the ancestral
wild strawberry plants found only in Monterey County,
California.  Most of the reviewers supported doing the test.
Two reviewers, Colwell and Alexander, said they did not
think their remaining concerns (after EPA HED's review)
warranted further delay of the field test.
In addition to these written opinions, SAP member
Randolph Borys was called by OPP Director Shatzow to clarify
his position on the FET's contention that P. syringae were
involved in atmospheric precipitation.  In October, Phillip
Grey, Executive Secretary of the regular PIFRA SAP, compiled
the responses and drafted a formal letter to OPP Director
Shatzow indicating that the SAP Subpanel supported HED's
position that the proposed field test was environmentally
benign.
A formal decision memorandum suggesting approval of the
AGS EUP was drafted by HED with assistance from EPA Office
of General Counsel attorney Pat Roberts.  This draft
memorandum was transmitted from Betz through Amy Ripson,
Chief of HED, to OPP Chief Steven Shatzow.  Rather than
presenting multiple decision options, the consensus
recommendation of the staff and the SAP, approval of the
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EUP, was presented in this memorandum along with arguments
rebutting anticipated arguments.
On November 6, 1985, Steve Shatzow transmitted the 7
page decision memorandum to EPA Assistant Administrator for
Pesticides and Toxic Substances Jack Moore.  The thrust of
the decision document sent from OPP Director Shatzow to Jack
Moore was that because of the absence of clearly
demonstrated weather modification, human pathogenicity, or
plant pathogenicity hazards, EPA's SAP staff, other federal
agencies and the special Subpanel all recommended approval
of the AGS EUP application.
On November 8, 1985, Assistant Administrator Jack Moore
approved the decision memorandum and the EPA granted
permission to AGS to pursue the field test.  In its letter
to AGS, EPA recommended the test be conducted in a remote
area and that AGS acquire the appropriate permits from the
state government agency with responsibility for such tests
in California, the California Department of Food and
Agriculture.
EPA officials from HED and the Office of Research and
Development visited the proposed test site on December 12,
1985 and approved its use by AGS.  ORD was represented in
order to ascertain requirements for the aerial monitoring
program it had planned for the test.  Apparently, the
proposed test site was located on an inactive farm near a
residential suburban area in the most densely populated
quarter of an agricultural county (Monterey).  An indirect
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confirmation that the site was in a higher density area is
found in subsequent EPA EUP requirements that AGS:
1) notify all contiguous property owners, and
2) obtain the approval of some adjacent property owners to
monitor off site dispersal of the GEMs on their
property.
F.  Utility of Information Processing
1.  Resolving Different Types of Uncertainty
The EPA review process used data from scientific
experiments and expert opinion to resolve most of the
scientific questions that arose in the case.  The
competition between INA and INA bacteria question was
resolved by interpreting greenhouse test data AGS provided.
The weather modification uncertainties were resolved by
using the expert opinions of the SAP member.
A third type of uncertainty arose in the course of EPA's
analysis of the reliability of the information provided by
the applicant.  With regard to off site transport, there
were discrepancies between the data and arguments AGS
submitted and published scientific evidence on population
dynamics of P. syringae.
Mr. Betz told the SAP:
"So we don't see any compelling reason to expect
that it would not survive and replicate.  We are
aware that AGS has submitted information showing
a decline of the microorganisms after
application....we don't think the data provides
conclusive proof that all the organisms
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necessarily died.  They do appear to have been
reduced to lower levels but depending upon
environmental conditions, it is conceiv6tble that
populations would rebound." (Betz, January 1985
SAP transcript)
Another indication of the potential for unreliable
information was a subsequent enforcement action against AGS
in which the company was fined for not accurately reporting
experimental conditions.  (EPA, 1986)
A fourth type of uncertainty raised in EPA's review is
the potential for different interpretations of the same
information based on different assumptions or scientific
models.  For example, EPA's treatment of the weather issue
rested on current models of atmospheric precipitation
formation as much as on empirical evidence.
Mr. Betz viewed the scientific questions of GEM
identity, non target plant pathogenicity, and competitive
relationships as being due to incomplete data, rather than a
result of unreliable data, conflicting information, or the
inadequacy of available scientific paradigms.  Accordingly,
provision of scientific data resolved the uncertainty he and
other EPA staff identified.  Had the HED analytic team
determined that the scientific uncertainties were the result
of unreliable information or inadequate scientific
explanation, the provision of more data by the applicant
would not have resolved the perceived uncertainties.
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Within HED, differences of opinion were resolved through
information consensus process among technical staff members.
Differences of opinion among SAP members were not discussed
or resolved.  Members independently submitted their reviews
of the adequacy of the AGS EUP to part of the decision
memorandtim Stapzow sent to Assistant Administrator Moore.
The questions Colwell and Alexander had were "absorbed" but
not explicitly resolved by the Chairman of the panel.  This
suggests that minority opinions, while solicited did not
dominate EPA's analysis of scientific effects.
2.  Importance of Scientific Information
From the start, it seems that the fraoning of scientific
questions that were the basis for EPA's regulatory analysis
of the AGS case reflected political and legal pressures on
the agency from the FET.  For example, the presence of a
meteorologist on the SAP is an indication the importance of
the weather modification scenario contained in the FET suit
that blocked the proposed test by Steve Lindow.  At least
for potential ecological effects, legal pressure was
important in gaining consideration in EPAs analysis.  The
analysis of acute toxic effects could be attributed to the
orientation of FIFRA towards acute health effects on humans.
Matching the lists of items discussed by HED and the SAP
with the initial list compiled by EPA HED shows small
changes in identified uncertainties and issues following
EPA's HED's initial information acquisition and analysis.
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Mere inspection suggests that the mass of information
obtained and prooessed by EPA did not substantially dispel
many areas of scientific uncertainty.  Presumably, the
function of the information obtained was not limited to the
reduction of scientific uncertainty.  An additional function
of the requested information could be to provide a public,
"objective" basis for justifying regulatory decision-
making.
EPA officials contacted in the course of this research
contend that:
1) EPA has collected a vast amount of scientific
information
2) the science is very well "pinned down", and
3) Public perception and politics are very important to
determining whether the field test can be executed.
(Betz, 1986)
Mr. Betz felt that the scientific and technological
information was extremely influential in the final decision
reached by EPA.  By contrast, Moore viewed the final
decision as in the court's and piiblic's hands. Accordingly,
he said that scientific and technical information was
relatively unimportant in the final decision of society.
This suggests that senior decision-makers have a different
perspective on the role of scientific information in
regulatory risk analysis than policy analysts.
Scientific and technical information are frequently
lumped together by non-scientists.  EPA's review focused on
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scientific rather than technical issues.  For exaanple, EPA
did not assess the techniques AGS devised to monitor off
site dispersal worked.  Engineering development needed to
obtain scientific data on atmospheric ice nuclei components
was not assessed by EPA.  Finally, engineering controls of
the Pseudomonas in the field during a test was not discussed
by EPA — only the scientific question of whether
substantial off site colonization and weather modification
could occur.  In short, relevant technical information was
not acquired, analyzed and presented as part of EPA's
decision making for the AGS case.
In summary, it seems that neither scientific nor
technical information obtained in EPA's analysis were
critical to resolution of the uncertainties posed by the AGS
EUP. EPA used the expert opinion of the SAP Subpanel but
relid heavily on the consensus of its staff.  Though the
analysis had elements of worst case analysis, evidence was
not always interpreted conservatively.  While many profound
scientific questions were asked, the criteria used to
evaluate the availetble evidence were not clear and could be
used to justify a prior outlook that the field test was
benign.
In the next chapter, the issues raised and the processes
used by California's state government to review the proposed
AGS test will be detailed.
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III.  DESCRIPTION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
INFORMATION PROCESSING AT THE CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
A.  Background
This section reviews the approach utilized by the
California State Departments of Food and Agriculture to
assess the safety of the proposed AGS experiment.  Special
attention is given to the information sources used and how
key risk assessment questions were frajned, explored and
resolved.  In comparison with most state programs,
California has an elaJDorate and well staffed environmental
protection apparatus.  The California Department of Food and
Agriculture (CDFA) has the largest pesticide registration
analysis staff of any state in the the United States. There
are cases in which EPA has registered chemical pesticides
that CDFA has not approved for use in California. The root
of this independent capability is a close working
relationship between CDFA and the substantial commercial
agricultural constituency it serves.
Policy Development
In the summer of 1984, the California Assembly asked the
Assembly Office of Research (analagous to the Congressional
Research Service) to investigate the authority available to
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California to regulate the emerging biotechnology industry.
An interdepartmental state Biotechnology Working Group was
formed to address any regulatory issues.  This Working Group
had representation from the public, industry, and state
government.  This Working Group decided that all
agricultural biotechnology products, (including microbes,
plants, and animals) would be regulated by CDFA either
within the existing pesticide or "exotic species
importation" framework.  This regimen meant that the
California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA). rather
than the California Department of Environmental Quality
would have regulatory authority for most ambient environment
biotechnology applications.  Applications outside CDFA's
purview such as sewage treatment systems, oil and ore
recovery applications, and artificial snowmaking could be
regulated by California's Department of Environment Quality.
Like EPA, CDFA decided to assess specific regulatory issues
on a case by case basis rather than in advance. No staff
additions were made to aid in biotechnology regulation.
(Rosenburg, 1986)
Companies intending to test genetically engineered crops
or microbes for agricultural purposes in California must
first obtain federal approval from EPA.  They must also
obtain a research use and a transportation permit.  The
research use permit is a similar but less formal procedure
than pesticide registration which governs wide scale
commercial usage of new substances.  (Goldberg, 1987) The
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transportation permit is analagous to the USDA's Animal
Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) permits required
for importation of new pathogens into the United States.
B. Transportation Permit Analysis:  What if the product isreleased en route to the test site?
Dr. Don Koehler, the individual who coordinated the
research use permit review, was not available during the
period in which the California interviews were conducted.
Accordingly, CDFA's transportation permit review will be
used to help illustrate the California's approach for
analyzing risks for the proposed AGS field test of
genetically engineered INA- bacteria.
1. Search Process
In mid- November, Dr. Conrad Krass, a senior member of
the Division of Plant Industry Pesticide Registration Branch
CDFA Analysis and Identification unit, was given the task of
analyzing AGSs' request for permits to transport plant
pathogens from AGS's lab facility in Oakland to a number of
potential field test sites within the state. The Analysis
and Identification unit has historically had two
responsibilities: first, identifying organisms brought to
the department by growers or county officials who fear them
to be harmful.  The second responsibility is to do
assessments of impacts of potential new pests to California,
and make recommendations on how to alleviate possible
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problems. Thus there is a sense in which the regulatory
questions posed in the AGS case were routine for the
Analysis and Identification Unit.  Formal CDFA
transportation permit analyses typically entail:
1. a literature review.
2. an exotic pest profile covering its history,
distribution, hosts, methods of detection, methods of
control, and
3. making recommendations for CDFA action.
Dr. Crass's analysis of AGS EUP transportation safety
was expected to take two weeks.  He expected that the most
questionable information would be which crops could be
infected by pseudomonas syringae in each affected county.
In contrast to the registration analysis which fooussed on
P. fluorescens. this analysis' focus was on P. syringae. a
documented plant pathogen.
Sources of Information
The first information sources provided to the Analysis
and Identification unit was the AGS EPA Experimental Use
Permit (EUP) application.  Second, Crass used the Pesticide
Registration Branch's extensive in house files and library.
The library was used extensively because there is a great
deal of information in the plant pathology literature
concerning P. syringae's interaction with commercial crops.
Third, Crass used the Dialog computer-based information
retrieval service to do an exhaustive literature search on
"^B?»?^-
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the organisms in question.  The fourth source of information
used was a group of University of California scientists.
These were selected because they had expertise on certain
plants' pathology These consultations were conducted by
telephone; no written confirmation memos or letters were
produced for inclusion in the CDFA records for the case.
The last information source utilized was AGS.  AGS provided
additional experimental results to CDFA scientists to assess
the pathogenicity of the genetically engineered INA- P.
syringae on non target host plants of commercial importance.
In evaluating the usefulness of these information
sources, Crass rated them as follows:
Table 3
In-house files
Scientific Literature:
Library-accessed
Dialog-accessed
AGS EUP Application
Univ. California experts discussion
(phone accessed)
Very useful
Very Useful
Very Useful
Somewhat useful
Somewhat useful
Crass reported that the AGS information search process
followed his typical pattern with two exceptions.  Dialog
was consulted because needed information was unavailable
through other sources (not because of possible time savings
through use of the database service).  The AGS experiments
were analyzed because the scientific literature did not
discuss AGS's engineered strain.
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2.  Analysis Processes
For the purpose of evaluating potential risks to
commercial agriculture in California, an accidental
transportation release of the entire quantity of ACS'
product was considered.  Since Crass assumed that standard
transportation control practices would break down away from
the proposed test site. Grass's analysis could be construed
a worst case contingency analysis.  Worst case was limited
to the experimental P. syringae leaving the site,
estetblishing colonies, and infecting various commercial
plants.  Crass did not consider possible effects on non
commercial non target species of plants and animals, local
ecoosystem function, ranges of temperature sensitive
species, or precipitation.  There was no attempt to quantify
the risk assessment.
From a disciplinary perspective, the main information
sources used by Dr. Conrad Krass were, in order of
importance: plant pathology, microbiology, and the ecology
literature for the two parent strains of ACS' test product.
Crass viewed little of the information he obtained as
uncertain.  The greatest perceived uncertainty concerned the
host plant range of the AGS P. syringae strains.  To resolve
these questions. Crass requested that AGS or the University
of California at Davis perform additional host range studies
in which the parent strain, the engineered INA- mutants, and
a known pathogen of the same species are tested on different
host trees.  These experiments provided evidence that
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alleviated Crass' perceived uncertainties.  Other than
scientific judgement in interpreting these tests, no special
analytic procedures were used to evaluate risks covered by
the California transportation permit.  Crass assumed
throughout his analysis that the behavior of the AGS
products in the field should closely resemble the behavior
of the parent strains.
3.  Presentation of Scientific and Technical Information
The conclusion drawn by Crass were presented in a
handwritten, half page memo to CDFA attorney Sharon Dobbins.
In this memo, he suggested that the permits be approved.
There was an understanding that decisionmakers wanted a
single recommendation rather than a detailed presentation of
different options.  Crass does not believe that any
techniques are more successful than any others in conveying
scientific or technical information or uncertainty. He
believes that prior attitudes color the reception of
uncertain scientific information on pesticide risks.  "How
you say it doesn't matter.  Some people are against all new
pesticides." (Crass, 1986)  In early December, Ms. Dobbins
sent a letter to AGS formally approving permits to transport
both AGS INA- species to twenty six counties in the northern
and central parts of the state. (Dobbins, 1985)
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C. CDFA's Experimental Use Permit Review
Scope of CDFA Review
Dr. Tobi Jones, Acting Branch Chief of the Pesticide
Registration Branch, was responsible for managing the review
of the AGS application for the experimental use permits.
When the review process started, the three scientific and
technical questions she identified as having the greatest
uncertainty were:
1. how could quality control be maintained for the
bacterial agents,
2. how could humans be monitored for whether any of the
bacterial agents had infected themselves, and
3. what the main areas of scientific safety questions
were for engineered microorganisms.
In accordance with CDFA's interim policy on regulating
biotechnology products, Dr. Jones decided to spread the
review of the application to a number of technical experts
in CDFA and other departments.  Three alternative
definitions of the potential hazards from FROSTBAN were
considered initially:
1. What is the human pathogenicity of the AGS strains?
2. What are the risks of environmental contamination?
3. What are the plant pathogenecity risks?
Rather than participate in the component analyses of the
scientific and technical questions analyzed to assess the
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safety of the proposed test, Dr. Jones reviewed its
conclusions, concurred, and presented them to higher
authorities in CDFA and outside groups.  Dr. Jones
designated DPRB staff member Don Koehler, a plant
physiologist, to coordinate the technical review and develop
a composite position and recommendation on the AGS
application. (Jones, 1986)
1. Search Processes
The primary responsibility for developing coordinating
the technical analysis of the safety of AGS' test product
and developing a CDFA position fell on Dr. Don Koehler, a
senior Plant Physiologist.  Dr. Koehler requested comments
on the EUP data package from a select group of individuals
in CDFAs Division of Pest Management and the CDFA
Biotechnology Working Group as well as representatives of
the California Department of Health Services, and the State
Water Resources Control Board.  Koehler asked reviewers to
address "Whether there will be environmental or health
hazards presented by the proposed small-plot testing on
strawberries, the significance of any such hazards, and
whether they can be mitigated." (Koehler, 1985) Each of
these groups were represented on the state Biotechnology
Working Group. The disciplinary backgrounds of these
reviewers included microbiology, toxicology, industrial
hygiene, entomology, bacteriology, water pollution, and
wildlife biology.
50
2. Analysis
Health Department Microbiologist Paul Duffey noted that
P. syringae has never been a human pathogen and that P.
fluorescens is only an opportunistic human pathogen.
Opportunistic pathogens are microorganisms that can
adversely effect certain hosts only when the hosts, e.g.
humans, are in a weakened condition due to other infection,
burns, or other trauma. Most reviewers concurred with this
characterization of the test strain's parents.
Duffey surmised that a high but indeterminate dose of P.
fluorescens was required to initiate human infection because
few variants naturally grow at human body temperature. He
suggested a set of chemical and physical controls to protect
applicators from breathing in a potentially infectious dose
of P. fluorescens.  The recommendations for worker
protection included use of a specific type of respirator,
procedures for chemical decontamination of clothing and
equipment, and a requirement for medical monitoring of the
applicators. Harvard R. Fong, an Environmental Hazards
Specialist in the Worker health and Safety Branch, amplified
on Duffey's recommendations, suggesting specific coveralls,
gloves, boots and goggles be used by applicators involved in
the test. (Mengle, 1985)
Etymologist Arun Sen suggested the desirability of
conducting experimental trials with beneficial insects to
examine the effects of using the AGS product on insect
pests.  Microbiologist H. Daoud, and J.F. Remsen, a
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toxicologist, requested that AGS do quality control tests to
assure that the experimental innoculum is the one identified
in the documentation and is viable. An Environmental Hazards
Specialist in the Medical Toxicology Branch of CDFA, T.E.
Esser, suggested that a contingency plan be developed for
early termination of the experiment in the event that the
organisms behave as pests.  Lesser, Remen, and Daoud
suggested AGS perform additional tests, that would be
desirable but would not required.  (Mengle, 1985)
In his review. Dr. Remsen noted "the question of
environmental impact needs to be addressed by the
appropriate evaluators." The California Fish and Wildlife
reviewer, John Shelgan, felt that there would be no adverse
effects on nontarget fish or wildlife from the test.
(Shelgan, 1985) Division of Water Quality Pollutant
Investigations Branch Chief Dr. David Cohen was concerned
about possible drift or discharge of the test bacteria to
the surrounding water bodies. He asked that aquatic
toxicology tests be performed prior to large scale field
testing.  (Cohen, 1985)
3. Resolution of Ambiguity and Conflicting Scientific
Interpretations
Dr. Koehler quickly developed a regulatory position on
the test that integrated most of the reviewers' control
suggestions but not the proposed experimental questions.  On
December 12, Koehler sent a memorandum supporting approval
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Of the EUP to Dr. Jones in which he responded to individual
reviewer concerns.  For example, in regard to two reviewers'
questions about quality control, Koehler noted that "each
batch of bacteria must be grown up fresh and used
immediately, since it is not stable...There is no reason to
expect that contamination would occur in this preparation,
when it has never been seen to be a problem previously."
Responding to the question about the test's effect on
beneficial insects, Koehler said,
"For the most part, these types of data(questions about beneficial insects) have to do
with larger scale testing or a Section 3
registration of this product...Exposure toinsects, wildlife, or bodies of water will be
extremely small, since considerable precautions
are being taken to prevent off-site movement,
and monitoring will be conducted to check for
this." (Koehler, 1985)
At the conclusion of the two page memorandum, Koehler
recommended that the state EUP be approved with requirements
for protective clothing for applicators, medical monitoring
of applications, and development of a plan for early
termination of the experiment.  Koehler's resolution of the
proposed experimental questions brought out in the review is
consistent with the theory that policy analysts "absorb
uncertainty."
^s^^^^g^^
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4. Decision Outcomes: The CDFA EUP Paper Trace
On the same day (December 12), Koehler sent a letter to
AGS Field Engineer Steven Cull approving California
experimental use permits for the P. syringae and the P.
fluorescens. The permits were subject to the following
conditions:
1. Personnel from CDFA and the Monterey County
Agricultural Commissioners Office were to be present as
observers when the application of the bacteria is made.
2. A contingency plan for the termination of the
experiment and destruction of the treated vegetation should
symptoms of disease or toxicity attributable to the
treatment occur be implemented.
3. Specific recommendations for worker protection
developed by the department of health services for medical
monitoring and protective clothing and equipment should be
followed.
4. EPA EUP conditions be followed, and all reports sent
to EPA concerning the results of the experiment be sent to
CDFA.
5. The Monterey County Agricultural Commissioner, Dick
Nutter shall be notified five days before the test and
invited to be present at the test.  (Nutter is an employee
of CDFA, under the Division of Plant Industry, and not of
the Monterey County to whom it also has responsibilities.)
(Koehler, 1985)
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The alacrity with which Koehler responded to the AGS
request after he completed his analysis, usurping one of
Jones' titular responsibilities, suggests that there may
have been some undocumented pressure to render an expedited
approval.
5.  Organizational Factors that Influenced CDFA's Process
Dr. Jones indicated that what made the AGS EUP process
organizationally atypical was the use of Koehler's special
review committee with membership outside of CDFA.  While
there was no precedent for handling genetically engineered
microbial pesticides, the CDFA had already developed a
procedure for such situations.  This protocol used existing
legal standards and required solicitation of (but not
adherence to) scientific judgments of extramural (out of
CDFA) reviewers.
Senior management at CDFA did not intervene in the
scientific information search process by working as team
members, monitoring information gathering, or providing tips
on possible sources.  When the staff presented its findings
to senior management, there was informal oral questioning.
Despite interdepartmental communication at the higher
"policy level" in developing the CDFA protocol for dealing
with genetically engineered agricultural products, the in
state transportation risk analysis was done by one person
without input from other scientists in his unit or the
health department.  This type of relatively cursory review
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is analagous to the type of review that USDA's APHIS does
for transportation of exotic plant imports.
In contrast, the analysis in support of the California
research use permit, analagous the federal EPA EUP, had
input from four different departments who conducted
independent analyses. This type of review can be
characterized as a composite review.  It was not truly
interdisciplinary, because no attempt was made to facilitate
two-way discussions between people in different fields.  The
paucity of consideration of broad environmental impact
questions may stem from differences in public participation
between the CDPA Research Use permit process and the EPA EUP
process.
As senior decisionmaker on this issue. Dr. Jones
indicated a detailed presentation of different options for
modifications of the permit would be less useful to a single
recommendation.  No attempt was made to replicate EPA's
time-consuming risk analysis review process.  While EPA was
a primary source of information, extramural scientific
review by University of California scientists was used as a
"reality check" on EPA's process outcome.
6.  Evaluation of the Utility of Scientific and Technical
Information
In terms of CDFA's decisions, Dr. Jones suggested that
three pieces of scientific information had the most weight
in the final CDFA decision to approve the permits: the
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microbial oompetition data, the comparative plant
pathogenicity data, and biochemical and taxonomic analyses
that indicated the similarity between the AGS INA- bacteria
and the parent strains of P. syringae and P. fluorescens.
The scientific literature on the pathogenicity and
toxicology of naturally occurring p. fluorescens was
necessary, but not as important to her as these three
sources.  Scientific and technical information, in contrast
to economic or political information, was described as
between moderately and extremely influential in reaching
CDFA's decisions by the CDFA personnel interviewed.
D. Comparison of CDFA with EPA
1.  Comparison of Scientific Issues
CDFA, like EPA was concerned with risks from nontarget
plant pathogenesis.  CDFA's solicitation of extra
experiments by AGS. monitored by the University of
California at Davis, indicates that risks to commercial
agriculture from nontarget plant pathogenesis were more
important to its decision than at EPA.  Individual EUP
reviewers reiterated AGS arguments that its INA- strains
were competitively inferior, although data submitted to EPA
Showed competitive equality. Nevertheless, CDFAs independent
transportation permit review assumed local domination of
INA- strains and found no adverse effect. While the absence
of competitive domination by applied INA- strains was an
important fact in EPAs decision to authorize its EUP, the
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relative competitiveness was not critical to the state EUP
authorization, with its more limited view of potential
hazards.
EPA reviewers did not comment on the potential for
changes in host ranges of beneficial insects, an indirect
ecological balance issue.  While a single CDFA reviewer
brought up this issue, Koehler said that the small scale of
the test obviated the need to assess it at this stage.
Thus, the small scale of the test was important to the
handling of different qualitative risk issues in the EPA and
CDFA permit review processes.
AGS Strain Identity
The identity of the AGS strains posed a major question
for the EPA reviewers.  EPA reviewers tended to treat the
AGS mutants as a new strain whose hazard they had to
evaluate.  In contrast. Dr. Jones was impressed by a high
level of similarity between the AGS strains and the parental
Pseudomonas strains shown by a set of bacterial physiology
tests.  Consequently, she felt justified in treating the AGS
EUP as a routine case with a high level of scientific
knowledge about the behavior of the bacteria.  EPA HED
personnel were not as comfortable with this qualitative
measure of similarity; consequently, they perceived the
scientific question of AGS organism identity as more non
routine.
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The greatest difference between scientific issues
considered in the the EPA EUP review and the CDFA review
concerned the issue of possible effects on precipitation.
EPA recruited an individual with a background in atmospheric
science to review the arguments.  In CDFA, plant
pathologists were responsible for obtaining information and
resolving the associated uncertainties.  Both EPA and CDFA
contacted NOAA consultant Russell Schnell by telephone to
solicit his views before rendering their final decisions.
CDFA required more controls than EPA to reduce potential
risks of human infection from applying AGS' P. fluorescens
strains. This may reflect the professional practices of
industrial health specialists represented in California's
review process, but not in EPA's.  EPA's SAP suggested
selection of a remote site, a physical control measure.  By
contrast, CDFA added no additional requirements for site
selection.  CDFA relied on chemical bacteriacides as a
control measure to combat any untoward contingencies during
the tests.
2.  Comparison of EUP Review Processes
Despite the precedent-setting nature of the case, CDFA
treated the case, with a few exceptions, in a generally
routine fashion, employing common processes to search,
analyze, and transmit scientific and technical information.
By contrast, the EPA, which also used an existing legal
framework designed for chemicals and conventionally selected
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organisms, employed a more pluralistic organizational
process to analyze scientific and technical information
related to the test.  Perhaps as a consequence of these
organizational process differences, CDFAs analysis focussed
on questions for which there was a high degree of perceived
scientific certainty.  EPAs analysis, by contrast, focussed
on questions for which there was a high level of perceived
uncertainty.
The process utilized by CDFA relied heavily on the
separate, independent scientific judgement of in house
experts. While there was a fairly broad disciplinary spread
among CDFA technical staff, few had any direct experience
with genetically engineered organisms, nor with the infant
art of "predictive ecology." Technical staff at CDFA availed
themselves of the resources of the University of California
University system, which is strong in both plant ecology and
genetic engineering.  This reliance contrasts with EAA's
more independent process.
Our review of the CDFA documents and the interviews with
participants supports the view of a compartmentalized,
independent scientific analysis process that followed a more
political policy setting process.  It is also plausible that
the political policy process preceded the scientific
approval process and merely waited long enough for
validation of its prior decision to "fish" rather than cut
bait.
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CDFA considered the state Research Use Permit and
transportation permit with less public knowledge and
participation than the EPA.  One rationale is that the EPA
function of obtaining input from the public had already been
sufficiently treated in the previous phase of the process.
Perhaps as a result, CDPA's process operated much more
quickly.  Like EPA, CDFA required AGS to notify a public
body in the component jurisdiction in which the test was
proposed.  Unlike EPA's requirement that AGS notify CDFS,
CDFA's requirement to notify County Agricultural
Commissioner Richard Nutter did not provide Monterey County
with an opportunity to independently review and potentially
reject the test proposal or site.  As an Agricultural
Commissioner, Nutter is an employee of the CDFA rather than
of the County, potentially compromising his independence.
The most important difference between CDFA and EPA's
policy regarding lower government levels is probably there
there was no requirement that the County government be
notified of the proposed test.  The test could be legally
conducted in secret under existing California law and
regulations in February, 1986.
At this point we will turn our consideration to
Monterey County, where the proposed test site was located.
IV.  DESCRIPTION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
INFORMATION PROCESSING AT MONTEREY COUNTY
A.  Background
The initial impetus for Monterey County's consideration
of the proposed AGS INA- field test was a petition tree
farmer Glenn Church filed with the Monterey County Board of
Supervisors on January 6, 1986.  The petition asked the
County Board of Supervisors to look into the safety of the
proposed test site and consider local regulation of the
experiment because of various unanswered questions.  Church
and other county residents had been in contact with FET
president Jeremy Rifkin, who served as an information source
to the local group.  Following CDFA's December approval of
the California EUP and transportation permits, persistent
rumors suggested that the site of the AGS test was the farm
of AGS field engineer Steven Cull.  Cull's property was
located near Castroville in the northern part of the county.
These reports were initially denied by AGS, CDFA, and EPA in
newspaper accounts.
Mark Del Piero is the Supervisor elected who represents
the northern district of Monterey County where Glenn Church
lived and the test was expected to be performed.  He
suggested to Chairman Sam Karas that Monterey County find
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out definitively what was being contemplated and what could
be done about the situation.  Karas called a meeting with
County Environmental Health Director Walter Wong and
Supervisor del Piero.  Wong was asked to lead a special
committee that would quickly define the extent of the
problem, if any, and determine what options are available to
the County to address it.  The Supervisors requested a
report as soon as possible, preferably within one week.
Walter Wong suggested that other county department heads
be represented on the special committee.  Members were:
Agricultural Commissioner Richard Nutter (a CDFA employee),
Director of Planning Robert Simmons, County Counsel Ralph
Kuchler, and Air Pollution Control Officer Larry Odle, and
Robert Melton, the Health Department Director and a medical
doctor.
Organizational Factors that Influence Search Processes
As Environmental Health Director, Mr. Wong's primary
duties relate to toxic materials, food sanitation, solid
waste and sewage, vector control and other public health
issues.  While the bulk of his department's work is
regulatory, special research projects are often undertaken
by the County Health Department.  Wong's time is split
between administration, research and analysis and
communication.
63
B.  Search Processes
When he started his analysis of the situation, Wong had
no trustworthy information available on the test site
location, acute health, environmental, or long term
ecological impacts from the proposed test.  Because of the
emotional impact of the topic in the County, Wong indicated
that it was very important.
Mr. Wong was individually responsible for defining the
issues posed by the experiment.  He defined five classes of
potential adverse effects to consider: agricultural impact
from unanticipated pathogenesis of crops, (agriculture is
very important to Monterey County, 90% of iceberg lettuce
grown in the U.S. is from Monterey County), htiman health
impacts, ecological impacts, financial lia±)ility for
unanticipated effects, and the lack of local input to
decision-making.
Prior to undertaking the process, Wong considered
himself to be very knowledgable about pesticides and quite
knowledgable about the field of genetic engineering.   The
press was a major source of information about the issues in
the initial phase of the investigation before Monterey
County's public hearing.
At the outset, the types of technical information that
seemed to have the greatest potential for being uncertain or
questionable for reasons of conflict of interest were the
following:
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- identity of bacteria being tested
- availability of assays for monitoring the field tests
- safety of tests
- bacterial pathogenicity (long term).
A number of organizational questions also seemed quite
uncertain.  These included:
- what organization would perform the tests;
- whether the federal government could regulate genetic
engineering if it cannot adequately monitor the
environment for the presence of the bacteria;
- whether the state needed information from AGS to do
its monitoring;
- what the legal options of the county were and
- when the proposed test would begin.
Sources of Technical Information
The first organizations contacted by Wong in his effort
to assess the significance of the proposed AGS experiments
were the EPA and CDFA.  These contacts were by telephone.
The second source of information was published documents in
peer reviewed science journals.  Along with them, the
Committee examined letters to editors in science journals
commenting on the development of the field of recombinant
DNA and the potential hazards associated with outdoor
applications of biotechnology.  Wong received initially
unsolicited input from a loose knit network of private
citizens in Monterey County who opposed the test.  The last
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source of information Wong tapped prior to the public
hearing was the Foundation on Economic Trends.
The first information acquisition mode, phone
interviews, was selected to save time and energy.  Federal,
state and industry sources were contacted.  Initially, these
sources refused to release information to the Health
Department on the grounds that it was proprietary to AGS.
In addition, EPA and the state of California were of the
opinion that Monterey County had no legal interest in the
case.
The second scientific and technical information source,
the published literature, was considered "not very useful"
because the Committee needed decision making criteria for
evaluating environmental releases.  Scientific articles did
not deal with such regulatory questions. Wong suggested that
one can only obtain opinions on decision making criteria in
person and on the phone.  The scientific literature did
suggest that the bacteria could be transported off a test
site.  There was no time for in person visits to any
information sources prior to the January 14 hearing.
The third source of information was the press.  While
the press did not provide technical information on the
organisms, the press used its resources to corroborate
previously unsupported rumors relevant to the test site and
test date.  For instance, an initial rumor, that the test
was planned for the Castroville property of AGS Field
Manager, Steven Cull, was corroborated by matching an EPA
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map of the test site with Salinas, California obtained with
an aerial photograph of the property.  The expense involved
in corroborating such useful information would have been
prohibitive for the county Health Department.
An important contribution to the process of information
acquisition was non scientific legal research on statutory
regulations and legal precedents.  The Board of Supervisors'
attorney, Ralph Kuchler and Sam Karas, operated
independently to examine these issues.  Kuchler examined the
interrelated legal requirements of federal, state, and local
laws.  Karas obtained a review of California's regulatory
regimen for biotechnology from the California Assembly
Office of Research.   It was through the attorney's review
of this document that the regulatory option of a land use
moratorium was devised.
Additional Sources of Input
Many "organizational uncertainties" bore on process of
gathering technical information.  First, there were
differences in the values and perspectives of the various
groups in the county.  In particular, there was a split
between the ecologically minded Carmel coastal area citizens
and the agriculturally minded residents of inland areas.
Wong made a conscious attempt to contact leading
agricultural powers in the county to assure that their
interests were not being overlooked in the County's
deliberations on the case.  In addition, there was a split
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between the less affluent, more remote southern two thirds
of the county and the more populous, suburban communities in
the northern third of the county.  Wong, Karas, and del
Piero touched base with political leaders in the different
sections of the county to obtain their perspectives.  The
organizational uncertainty that most impressed the entire
committee was the lack of precedent for handling such
situations.  To its collective knowledge, no local community
in the world had dealt with a deliberate release of a
genetically engineered microorganism in its jurisdiction
yet.
In the face of these uncertainties, the full County
Board of Supervisors met on January 14th.  Wong presented
two alternative recommendations to the Board of Supervisors:
1) that AGS be asked to find a site further away from
residential areas or 2) conduct a public hearing in which
testimony from AGS, EPA, CDFA, and citizens would be
received.  In an emotionally charged hearing room with over
150 opponents of the planned test, the Board of Supervisors
decided to hold a formal hearing on January 27 in which
testimony from AGS, EPA, CDFA, and citizens could be
presented.
The level of external political pressure on the County
Board of Supervisors started to rise.  At this hearing they
received a telegram from 27 Green party members of the West
German parliament (Bundestag).  The telegram said, " Our
health and environment must not be sacrificed to the
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commercial interests who are so eager to bring their new
living engineered products to the marketplace." (San
Francisco Chronicle. 1986) Shortly thereafter, Karas' and
Wong's phone began to ring off the hook as representatives
from CDFA, the California Department of Health, the
California Commerce department, individual legislators, and
EPA personnel called to suggest that local regulation of
outdoor applications of biotechnology was inappropriate.
Karas insisted that all information be funnelled through
Walter Wong so that he would have the broadest range of
sources and serve as the County's primary scientific
resource.  Because of the high level of political pressures,
and technical controversy and public relations experience
involved in the case, Wong decided not to allocate any
research tasks to junior people in his department, but
rather to do the subsequent analysis personally.
C. Analysis Processes
In his review of the AGS EUP support data, Wong noted
that one of seven rabbits treated with the bacterial
preparation developed an infection.  Although this infection
cleared up with time, Wong was concerned that it could
indicate possible toxicity to humans. He urged AGS and CDFA
to repeat the dermal application test.  Wong was also
concerned with the toxicity test used because it was
designed to test the acute toxicity of chemicals and not the
pathogenicity or other chronic effects of bacteria.  AGS,
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EPA and CDFA did not agree to repeat any tests, asserting
that Monterey County had no right to assess health issues
where the federal government had preemptive authority.
The literature indicated that monitoring protocols for
INA- bacteria test were readily available, although it was
unclear whether genetic markers were present in the AGS
formulation to permit distinguishing of genetically modified
INA- bacteria form naturally occurring INA- strains.  CDFA
and EPA did not share this information AGS designated as
"confidential business information" (CBI) with Wong.
The reputation of Pseudomonas aeroginosa as a human
pathogen did impress Wong because of the differences between
P. aeroginosa. P. syringae and P. fluorescens hosts.
However, the ability to absorb antibiotic resistance bearing
plasmids from other pseudomonads did suggest an additional
risk factor to Wong.  In the 14 days between the Jan 14
Supervisors' meeting and the Jan 27 hearing, Wong could only
use a process of elimination to analyze questions concerning
adverse effect scenarios EPA and CDFA hadn't explicitly
dealt with.
Wong thought the risk with the greatest percentage of
adverse effect was of pathogenesis to nontarget agricultural
species by P. syringae. a known plant pathogen. Wong felt
that the threat of climatic change resulting from the test
was minimal.  However, some offsite dispersal seemed
inevitable, particularly if the test was executed (as
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planned) in February, historically the rainiest month in
Monterey County.
Accordingly, the site selection issue emerged as the
most important county issue.  Wong again requested that
CDFA, EPA, or ACS definitively identify the location of the
proposed test site.  None of the organizations complied with
the request, fueling both public and County staff suspicion
that the test was slated for a property in the northern
third of the county.  Wong worked on the assumption that the
test would be conducted in a mixed farming and residential
area like the one in which Steve Cull's property was
located.   He noted that CDFA required protection of
applicators, but residents were not provided with protective
clothing and masks.  This juxtaposition could make it look
as if the County was not adequately protecting the health of
its residents.
A related county responsibility issue concerned
potential liSLbility.  The FET suggested that the County
could be liable for possible adverse off site effects from
the test even if such effects result from mistakes made by
ACS .  The County counsel reviewed this issue and supported
the PET'S interpretation.  Potential county liability was
perceived as another reason for having a say in the
selection of a site for the test.
In conjunction with the rest of the special committee,
Wong and Planning attorney Kuchler prepared a decision
option for Monterey County based on its statutory power to
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regulate land uses within the county.  According to the
committee's analysis, AGS' INA- GEMs are animals, and
application of nonindigenous GEMs is a new land use in the
county. AGS could be required to obtain a land use permit to
assure that their field test is in concord with the county's
land use zoning for that area.
The Public Hearing as an Analytic Process
On January 27, the Monterey County Board of Supervisors
held a seven hour hearing on the test proposal.
Representatives of AGS, CDPA, EPA, the PET, and independent
scientists supporting and opposing the test testified in
front of a packed auditorium.  National and international
news media reported on the event.  At the hearing, the
primary issues were: the organizational responsibilities,
the selection of a remote site, and the potential for
ecological disruption from competition between AGS'GEM and
natural INA+ bacteria.
AGS Director of Marketing and Product Support Douglas
Serojak began the meeting by offering to : postpone the test
for 30 days to fully address local concerns, provide all
information to the supervisors regarding the details of the
test, and relocate the trial within Monterey County based on
consultation from the appropriate local officials.   Trevor
Suslow, Director of Product Research, suggested that the
proposed test is a small step on the road to responsible
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development of environmentally sound commercial agriculture.
He said that
"These are not new issues, merely the same
uncertainties now being discussed in a public
forum...  Those given the public responsiblity
(EPA, CDFA) of evaluating the merits (of the AGS
EUP data) have determined an absence of any real
danger to humans, animals, plants, or the
environment...Our shortcoming has been to wholly
underestimate the abilities of anti-
technologists to manipulate the fears of
responsible concerned citizens and scientists
who haven't had ready access to all the
information."
AGS Project Director Julianne Lindemann (a former
colleague of Steven Lindow at the University of Wisconsin)
said that worst case analyses for the experiment had been
evaluated.  She used an elaborate analogy of senior, junior,
and sophomore students piling into Volkswagens in a parking
lot to describe the competition between INA+ and INA-
bacteria on strawberry blossoms on which all the impact
scenarios hinged.  She suggested that because genetically
engineered INA- bacteria have growth behavior like wild type
INA+ parents in a variety of hostile laboratory environments
(dessicated soil, freezing, heating), they should not be
considered as essentially novel organisms.  Accordingly,
analogies using exotic species introductions such as the
Kudzu vine or Dutch Elm Disease are "not appropriate or
accurate." She ended AGS' presentation by saying " I ask you
to please bear these facts in mind as you, listen to the
hypothetical disaster scenarios, illogic, and misinformation
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brought forward as fact by those who wish to stop this
experiment." (Advanced Genetic Sciences, 1986)
Edward Lee Rogers, the Foundation on Economic Trends
counsel, presented a prepared statement on behalf of FET
president Jeremy Rifkin.  In this statement, he outlined a
set of scientific uncertainties that suggested shortcomings
in the EPA process.  He confined his comments to the
precedent-setting nature of the test from a legal
perspective and the uncertainties associated with P.
syringae's atmospheric ice nucleation activity.
Acting CDFA Pesticide Registration Branch Chief Dr.
Tobi Jones testified on behalf of CDFA.  She emphasized the
fact that the state of California and EPA were treating the
Frostban product as a pesticide, and that an analysis of the
parent bacteria strains shows that they are not hazardous to
either humans or commercial crops.
EPA was represented by Fred Betz.  He described the
process by which HED and the SAP reviewed the AGS
application and resolved uncertainties concerning possible
risks from the experiment.  EPA FIFRA SAP Subpanel reviewer
and University of California at Berkeley biologist Robert
Colwell indicated his support for the small scale test as
approved in the EPA process; however, he said that he had
reservations about widespread commercial use at this time.
Sloan Kettering geneticist Liebe Cavalieri pointedly
disagreed with AGS' scientists, saying that the test
organisms were genetically different from the naturally
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occurring INA- bacteria, and consequently their behavior
could not be identical to the parents. He suggested the test
could have "potentially catastrophic consequences."
(Cavalier, 1986)
The majority of comments from members of the public
unaffiliated with groups reflected a distrust of AGS and of
the safety of the experiment.  The question and answer
period amplified this sentiment.  In response to a
questions, Douglass Serojak denied the Cull property in del
Piero's district was the planned site of the test, although
he offered to work with the supervisors to find another
site.  EPA biologist Fred Betz admitted "We used the
description of the site and surrounding area provided by
AGS.  Our representatives should conduct on -site
inspections, but we don't usually do it." Betz's comment
prompted Supervisor Del Piero to comment, "That's a hell of
a way to run any kind of agency." (Del Piero, 1986)
County Attorney Ralph Kuchler delivered an opinion on
the aJDility of the County to regulate novel microorganisms.
The thrust of his opinion was that while the federal and
state governments have preemptive authority for chemical
pesticides, a field test of the AGS product, a live
bacterium, represented a novel land use and could be
regulated as such by county zoning ordinances.
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D.  Decision Outcomes
On the basis of the received testimony and the assembled
political pressures, the County Supervisors adopted a set of
four motions culminating in a 45 day emergency moratorium on
field tests of new genetically engineered biological
materials in the county.  The action called for :
1. a special committee to be appointed by the Board of
Supervisors to learn more about the field test,
2. this committee shall cooperate with AGS in identifying an
alternative, more remote site for the test, and
3. the committee should learn enough about the field test to
assure that the Supervisors that the test will not present
any significant risk to the community or the environment,
and
4. a 45 day period commencing on January 27 in which AGS
agrees to postpone conducting the proposed test.
AGS representatives agreed to the 45 day postponement at
the hearing.  The Board asked the committee to work with
legislative staff in the county and state to draft an
appropriate zoning ordinance for regulating such experiments
in Monterey County by its Feb 11 meeting.
At the February 11 Board of Supervisors meeting, Mr.
Wong presented a report by the same special committee that
was convened earlier to define the problem at hand.  Members
were: Supervisor Sam Karas, Supervisor Mark Del Piero,
Agricultural Commissioner Richard Nutter, Director of
76
Planning Robert Simmons, County Counsel Ralph Kuohler, and
Air Pollution Control Officer Larry Odle.  On the basis of
testimony at the hearing and its subsequent review, the
committee's principal findings were:
1. Federal and state procedures for granting AGS' EUP were
deficient in:
a. not requiring an independent risk assessment,
b. not making an onsite inspection of proposed site,
c. not responding to issues raised by the County Board,
d. not providing detailed information on human health
effects and not requiring follow-up tests.
2. The testing would have minimal impact on plant
physiology.
3. Legal issues relating to the California Environmental
Assessment Process, and the authority to regulate
genetically engineered pesticides need to be reviewed.
(Monterey County Investigative Committee, 1986)
The Committee unanimously voted to recommend an Interim
Ordinance prohibiting "Ezperimental Field laboratories using
experimental Genetically Altered Bacteria" for 45 days.
This recommendation was unanimously adopted by the Board of
Supervisors on February 11.
Soon afterwards, Karas and Wong were invited to testify
before an Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee of the
U.S. House Committee on Science and Technology.  A former
AGS employee, Dennis Botstein, disclosed that AGS had
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illegally conducted plant pathogenicity tests on the roof
top of its Oakland facility prior to receiving the EPA EUP.
At this hearing, SAP member Robert Colwell reversed his
support for the proposed February 1986 field test because
EPA ignored his proposed recommendation that the test be
conducted in a remote area.  In light of these findings,
Monterey County leaders felt vindicated in their decision to
block the proposed February field test.
In March 16, 1986, with almost no debate, the Monterey
County Board of Supervisors passed a temporary, one year
moratorium on experiments involving genetically altered
bacteria.  At this point, Monterey County ceased active
consideration of the safety of the AGS test proposal.  Sam
Karas and Walter Wong continued to press their views on the
public participation and legal issues that arose in Monterey
County in federal and state legislative forums, the media,
and California state agencies during the balance of 1986.
E.  Organizational Roles in Evaluation of the AGS EUP
In the Monterey COunty process, Health Department
Director Walter Wong acted as both a risk analyst and as a
risk manager, personally searching for scientific
information, ezamining the data submitted (after the
hearing) by AGS to EPA and CDFA, and maintaining liaison
with major corporate and community agricultural interests in
a highly agricultural county.  Perhaps most importantly, the
individual who undertook the analysis of risks posed by the
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case was involved in upper level discussions of how to
manage the situation.  By contrast, the EPA and CDFA reviews
of AGS EUP separated the risk management responsibility from
the risk assessment functions so effectively that the
individuals doing the analysis of the EUP did not report any
political pressure in a major precedent-setting case.
One reason Wong may have assumed so much responsibility
was the fact that Chairman Sam Karas, a businessman, did not
have a formal background in the sciences like the senior
decisionmakers in EPA and CDFA.  Mr. Karas consulted two
independent sources of scientific information in addition to
Wong and the investigative committee.  The first was a
personal friend who was a science teacher at the local
community college. He gave Karas, a former executive in the
meat packing industry, a basic background on microbiology.
The second source Karas consulted was Paul Berg, a Nobel
Laureate, Professor of Biochemistry at nearby Stanford
University, and a participant in the 1973 Asilomar
Conference, at which biologists first considered the
implications of the ability to artificially recombine
genetic material from different organisms.  Ironically, the
Asilomar Conference Center is also in Monterey County.
F.  Trust and the Burden of Proof
It seems that in Monterey County the burden of proof was
shifted from the F.E.T. to AGS to prove the safety of the
tests beyond a reasonable doubt.  Monterey County accepted
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circumstantial evidence in evaluating the merits of the AGS
test proposal, for example, the resemblence between the EPA
site map and the aerial photo of Cull's property published
by the Salinas Californian.  By contrast, EPA's scientific
review panel didn't accept circumstantial evidence like INA+
P- syringae in raindrops as relevant to its consideration of
"scientific risks" posed by the test.  In the case of a
reasonable doubt, EPA seemed to defer to a no significant
risk interpretation.  In contrast to both EPA and Monterey
County, CDFA did not identify that many uncertainties in its
analysis.
Underlying both the burden of proof and the trust
questions are organizational questions of what bodies should
society rely upon to do risk assessments for new technology
products.  In subsequent testimony to the House Science and
Technology Subcommittee, Wong suggested that organizations
with financial interests in the outcome, such as AGS, are
inappropriate evaluators of risks from their projects.
(Wong, 1986c)
The oft-mentioned specter of qualitatively different
types of adverse effects resulting from field application of
these INA- bacteria hung in the background of Monterey's
considerations.  However, that scientific issue did not seem
to be as salient as the cavalier attitude with which CDFA
and EPA brushed off Wong's requests for additional tests to
assure safety of residents of the area adjoining the test
site.
8 0
One question that had not arisen in the CDFA and EPA
consideration was the rights and responsibilities of local
communities vis a vis outdoor tests of biotechnology
products.  Glenn Church, the community leader who initiated
Monterey County's consideration, said, "there's a lot of
questions but the real question involves the right of the
community to protect itself.  No one asked county residents
if they wanted to be the test site for the first
microorganisms test in the whole world." (Church, 1986)
Supervisor Karas echoed this sentiment in testimony before
the House Science and Technology Committee .  He said,
"Failure on their (EPA and CDFA) part to notify us of an
experiment of such national, if not worldwide significance,
is unconscionable...no public official in the jurisdiction
most effected was notified." (Karas, 1986b)
Finally, while risks and scientific uncertainties were
given as the basis for decisions by Monterey County, press
reports indicate that an informal cost benefit analysis
weighed the potential benefits from this particular
biotechnology application. Environmental Health Director
Walter Wong said.
"Local strawberry growers do not have a problem
with frost."  Monterey County is not the optimum
site for the testing.  The major reason for
testing here is the proximity to Advanced
Genetic Sciences' (Oakland laboratory
facility)." (Wong, 1986)
V.  CONCLUSIONS
Four distinct types of risk were identified in the
problem definition phase of the analyses of the AGS field
test proposal.  These are human infection, plant
pathogenesis, weather alteration, and ecosystem disruption.
As Table 4 indicates, EPA, CDFA, and Monterey County
focussed on different types of hazards.  The lack of
consensus between organizations could reflect differences in
organizational responsibilities and environmental values as
well as differences of opinion concerning the probability
and undesirability of each risk from the proposed
experiment.
Table 4
Four Types of Risks Identified in Analysis of
AGS, Inc. Field Test Proposal
Principal Concern of Risk Analysis
A. Human Infection
B. Plant Pathogenesis
C. Weather Alteration
D. Ecosystem Disruption
Organization
Monterey County
California
EPA
None
Five sources of scientific and technical information
were used by the organizations we surveyed.  These sources
were the scientific literature, individual scientists,
expert panels, court cases, and new experiments.  Three
sources (individual scientists, expert panels, and court
cases) can provide political or non technical information
along with technical information.
EPA, CDFA, and Monterey County used a variety of
information channels to access the technical information the
aforementioned sources had.  The agencies that utilized each
channel are shown in Table 5.
Table 5
Information Channels used in Regulatory
Analysis of AGS EUP
_______________Channel______________      Agencies
A. Agency Libraries CDFA
B. Online Catalog Services CDFA
C. Formally Constituted Expert Panels EPA
D. Informal Network of Experts MC, CDFA
E. AGS Scientists EPA, CDFA
F. University Scientists CDFA
G. Public Hearings MC
No organization used formal analytic techniques or
statistical methods in the evaluation of the EUP or
supporting data.  All three organizations undertook some
sort of worst case analysis.  Each worst case analysis had
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different assumptions that bore on the scientific
conclusions that could be reached by risk analysts.  A
characterization of the key worst case analysis assumptions
used in each organization is given in Table 6.
Table 6
Assumptions for Worst Case Scenario Evaluation
EPA assumed that the weather could change, but assumed
substantial off site transport and colonization would
not occur.
CDFA assumed that off site transport and colonization could
occur, but assumed that changes in the weather could
not occur as a result of changes in the distribution of
INA+ p. syringae in the atmosphere.
MC assumed that off site transport and colonization could
occur, but assumed that changes in the weather could
not occur as a result of changes in the distribution of
INA+ P. syringae in the atmosphere.  MC also assumed
that there was a possibility of human infection.
The scientific assumptions each organization made in
order to undertake its risk analysis led to differences in
the key parametric uncertainties in each analysis.  Key
parametric uncertainties are uncertainties in which
experimental finding could lead to a reversal of a
conclusion.  A summary of these critical uncertain
parameters is given in Table 7.
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Table 7
Key Parameteric Uncertainty Organization
Competition between INA- GEM EPAand wild type INA+ bacteria
Pathogenicity of INA- GEM to CDFA
Important Commercial Plant
Families Grown near Test Site
Human Infection Potential MC
All three organizations requested that new experiments
be performed to help resolve the uncertainties they
considered critical.  In evaluating the new experimental
data requested, EPA, CDFA, and Monterey County seemed to use
differing standards.  Distillations of these de facto
criteria are shown in Table 8.
Table 8
Implicit Criteria Used to Evaluate New Experimental
Data Requested in Analysis of AGS Field Test Proposal
EPA  Will GEMs outcompete INA+ P. syringae to the extent
that functional populations no longer exist (inclouds).
CDFA If GEM response is identical to parental strains on a
battery of microbial physiology tests, it is
considered functionally equivalent to the parental.
If GEM causes pathogenic change on a target plant thatlooks like changes caused by known pathogen, then GEMshould be considered pathogenic for that plant.
MC   If there is any doubt as to human infectiousness of
INA- product, do not accept presumption of safety.
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With the exceptions of the criteria utilized by CDFA to
analyze non target pathogenesis by the AGS GEM and the
criteria proposed by Monterey to evaluate the chronic human
pathogenicity, the organizations surveyed did not formulate
criteria for evaluation of requested experimental data prior
to receipt of this information.  The absence of explicit
prior criteria and operational hypotheses permitted
organizations evaluating the safety of such experiments to
use whatever data is received to justify a decision that is
already favored by an organization.
In each organization, there were instances in which
differences of opinion on the meaning of scientific and
technical information arose.   The three organizations
relied on the judgement of individuals rather than analytic
methods.  However, different individuals were responsible
for actually resolving identified uncertainties in the
organizations.  A characterization of the principal
organizational processes used to resolve technical
uncertainties is shown in Table 9.
Table 9
Processes for Resolving Identified Uncertainties
Consensus of Technical and Legal Staff:        EPA
Judgement of Individual Analyst: CDFA
Collective Perception of Constituency: MC
at Hearing
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On the basis of the analysis of the technical issues
each organization pursued, it is possible to interpolate
some of the underlying assumptions shared by the technical
analysis teams in each organization.  For the sake of
brevity, I have divided organizational views on each
environmental biotechnology risk topic into two opposing
sides.  Within two organizations, there were some
discrepancies in the fundamental assumptions held by
analysts.  For example, a CDFA reviewer mentioned indirect
effects on the ranges of beneficial insects, but the final
agency position was that such changes were not possible from
the AGS test.  Similarly, an EPA SAP member mentioned the
potential for changes of the ranges of insects from
application of INA- GEMs, but EPA staff did not analyze such
potential changes.  These interpolated assumptions about GEM
introduction are shown in Table 10.
Table 10
Risk Analysis Assumptions
Topic Viewpoint Organization
Identity of AGS
test product
Quantitative
Effects Threshold
Indirect Ecosystem
Effects (ranges of
insects)
Horizontal Transfer
of INA Trait
Influence of
Environmental Con¬
ditions on Growth
Novel
Parental
Yes
No
Possible
Not Possible
Considered
Not Considered
Important
Unimportant
EPA, MC
CDFA.
EPA, MC
CDFA
CDFA, MC, EPA
two reviewers
EPA, CDFA, MC
MC
EPA, CDFA
•
Each organization had a requirement for presenting
scientific and technical information to other analysts and
to senior decisionmakers.  All three organizations relied on
verbal communication.  The only graphics used were part of
an EPA public information package prepared after a decision
had been reached.  All the reviewing organizations used
textual descriptions rather than scales to characterize the
level of uncertainty present in each issue.  The primary
difference concerned the length and mode of verbal
communications.  The principal information presentation
vehicles used to communicate within the reviewing
organizations are described in Table 11.
Table 11
Internal Information Presentation
Organization _____Presentation Mode______
1) among field test analysts
2) to senior decision maker
EPA:   1) Primarily used exchange of 10+ page written
drafts
2) Presentation to senior decision maker was a 7
page formal decision memorandum.
CDFA:   1) Primarily used 1-2 page interoffice mini-memos,
2) 2 page internal justification written prior to
decision
MC:    1) Primarily oral interaction in meetings and on
telephone.
2) Primarily oral, 2 page memos written prior to
decision
Monterey County's extensive use of oral interaction
could be due to the tighter time constraints in which it was
was operating as well as underlying differences in legal
requirements and management style.
The utility of the scientific and technical information
acquisition and analysis process may be examined by looking
at the evidence each organization had on the scientific
issues it identified as most crucial to its decision.  The
reduction of uncertainty as a result of new information is
hard to characterize.  On the basis of the interviews with
analysts and examination of the documents that were used,
summary characterizations of the uncertainty reduction
achieved by each organization on given issues are made.
Table 12 shows some of the principal scientific issue the
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reviewing organizations were concerned with and a composite
characterization of the uncertainty reduction vis a vis that
issue that was achieved.
Table 12
Did information acquisition actually reduce perceived
uncertainties in analysis of AGS EUP?
Organization ______Issue______ Uncertainty Reduction
EPA Weather Alteration        Partial
CDFA Pathogenicity Yes
MC Toxicity in Humans No
EPA was able to make a decision in the face of arguable
scientific uncertainty concerning possible climatic
involvement of P. syringae.  CDFA was ab>le to convincingly
resolve its plant pathogenicity question with information it
acquired.  Monterey was unable to obtain new experimental
information to reduce its uncertainty about the mammalian
toxicity of the AGS GEM.
The salience of scientific and technical input in
regulatory decisionmaking is difficult to assess for many
reasons.  Certainly, political factors are more important to
the functions of senior decision makers than to staff
analysts.  The opinions of senior management and analysis
staff in each organization that reviewed the AGS EUP on the
relative importance of the scientific and technical
information are displayed in Table 13.
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Table 13
How important was scientific and technical information
relative to political and organizational information in
making the final decision?
EPA Senior Management Low
EPA Staff High
CDFA Senior Management High
CDFA Staff High
MC Senior Management Low
MC Staff Low
CDFA Staff we interviewed apparently collectively viewed
the AGS EUP decision as a scientific and technical decision
with relatively unimportant political inputs.  Monterey
County viewed the scientific and technical information as
relatively unimportant relative to organizational factors.
At EPA, technical staff viewed the scientific and technical
information as critical to the final EPA decision. In
contrast, the senior decisionmaker for this case viewed the
scientific and technical information as less important.  The
difference of opinion between the EPA officials could
reflect the chasm between the concerns of senior management
and staff personnel.  Perhaps we can conclude that
scientific and technical information was not necessarily
critical to regulatory decisions concerned with the proposed
AGS field test.
The processes employed by EPA, CDFA. and Monterey County
to analyze the AGS EUP each had elements of routine
processing and non routine information processing.  It is
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unclear whether the non routine nature of the scientific
questions raised by the AGS EUP resulted in non routine
information processing.  Summary characterizations of the
processes the three organizations employed are given in
Table 14.
Table 14
Did the Non Routine Scientific Nature of AGS EUP Questions
Result in Non Routine Information Processing
Organization       ______Characterization of Process_____
EPA Non Routine but formal process
oriented to resolving scientific
uncertainties.
CDFA Routine, compartmentalized process
with some participation by other state
agencies.
MC Non Routine with representation of
senior management in investigative
team.
CDFA's analysis process was the most similar to the
procedures used to handle routine, chemical EUPs.  EPA
treated the decision as non routine but not unprecedented.
EPA's process was based on a time-honored way of handling
non routine decisions in the government, using an expert
panel.  Perhaps because Monterey County viewed the case as
unprecedented, it devised a special strategy just for this
case.  Monterey County's process most closely resembled the
processes used by private organizations to handle non
routine decisions, with closer collaboration of senior
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management and technical staff.  The hypothesis that the non
routine scientific and technical aspects of the case would
cause each organization to adopt non routine information
processing procedures is not borne out by this research.
The notion that the AGS case would be treated like a
crisis because the advent of environmental biotechnology
decreased the effective lead times available to government
personnel may be evaluated by seeing whether common
characteristics of crisis management situations were
present.  Table 15 recaps five reported characteristics of
crisis management situations and reviews the evidence for
these characteristics in the AGS case.
Table 15
Crisis Management case studies suggest the following
characteristics of crisis decisionmaking.
____Characteristic______        Evident in AGS Case
No Time to Do Analysis no
Reliance on Past Search no
Cognitive Rigidity yes
Reduced Consideration of
Alternatives yes
Reduced Tolerance for
Ambiguity no
In the AGS case, most organizations had time to do
analysis of the questions at hand.  No organization relied
on past searches, all undertook new searches.  All three
organization seemed to display cognitive rigidity in
analyzing risks from the test.  None of the three
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organizations considered a cross section of risk management
alternatives discussed in the literature on regulation of
environmental biotechnology applications. Since only two of
five characteristics of crisis management situations were
evident in the AGS case, the crisis management literature
does not seem to be a particularly apt analogy for the types
of problems that arose in the AGS case.
The Importance of Disciplinary Background
The disciplinary background of the individuals and the
orientation of the organizations that evaluated the AGS EUP
are displayed in Taisle 16.
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Table 16
Disciplinary Orientation of Organizations Surveyed
Disciplines Represented Dominant Disciplines
Organization   in AGS EUP Analysis      in Organization
EPA
CDFA
MC
Microbiology
Plant Pathology
Atmospheric Science
Microbial Ecology
Environmental Toxicology
Zoology
Soil Science
Chemistry (staff)
Engineering (staff)
Law
Plant Pathology
Microbiology
Medical Toxicology
Water Pollution
Entymology
Industrial Hygiene
Public Health
Planning
Medicine
Law
Chemistry
Engineering
Plant Pathology
Public Health
At this point, it is not clear what disciplines are most
relevant to the analysis of effects from introduction of
GEMs into natural environments.  Differences in the
professions represented on teams analyzing the proposed test
for the three organizations could account for differences in
the foci of the analyses as well as the evaluation of
information obtained in the analysis.  The influence of
disciplinary orientation on the identification of critical
information by individuals involved in the AGS EUP analysis
is explored in Table 17.
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Table 17
Influence of Disciplinary Orientation in
Problem Identification
Individ¬
ual Education
Betz Envr. Engr., MS
Moore Vet. Toxicology, PhD
Most Important Information
Competition, Scale of test
Pathologic host range of
parent organism
Crass    Plant Pathology, PhD  Pathogenicity towards non
target plants
Jones Microbiology, PhD Microbial physiology
Wong Public Health, MS Chronic Human pathogenesis
Karas Business, High School Organizational Issues
Rogers Chemistry, Law JD Ecosystem Impacts
The theory that individual analysts would focus their
attention on components of the larger regulatory question
that are part of their individual or institutional
disciplinary heritage is strongly supported by the responses
of Ph.D.'s interviewed in this case study.  A slightly
different picture, showing increasing importance of
institutional affiliation, is suggested by the responses of
interviewees without doctoral training.  Wong's concern
about the interpretation of acute mammallian toxicity tests
is consistent with his departmental responsibilities that
include analyzing acute effects of agricultural pesticides
on applicators.  Mr. Rogers' concern with ecosystem impacts
is more resonant with his organizational role as FET counsel
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than his background in law or chemistry.  Mr. Betz's
responses generally displayed less disciplinary direction of
concern than other interviewees.  Apparently, scientists we
interviewed viewed the most critical questions raised in
evaluation of the AGS EUP as questions relating to their
individual academic background.  Individuals without Ph.D.'s
tended to reflect more concerns of their organization as
well as their principal disciplinary background.
While a diverse interdisciplinary review panel was
assembled by EPA, and CDFA invited reviewers with a wide
variety of academic backgrounds, scientific concerns
identified by individual team members were not synthesized
by EPA or CDFA staff into adverse effect scenarios to be
evaluated.  For ezeimple, SAP member Martin Alexander's
concerns about offsite transport were not linked with
Colwell's concerns eibout potential ecosystem function
impacts from wider scale tests.  Likewise, CDFA's AGS EUP
reviewers identified some ecological and safety concerns not
addressed by EPA.  These concerns were not linked together
with EPA's analysis in CDFA's consideration of the EUP.
The primary interdisciplinary scenario that was evaluated
was synthesized not by agency staff, but by the F.E.T.  This
suggests a weakness in EPA's present capacity to analyze
proposed environmental biotechnology applications by
scenario analysis.
Lack of representation of the ecology discipline at a
staff level has been suggested by some observers as one
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reason for inadequate consideration of ecological effects of
engineered organism introduction.  The presence of
ecologists and entymologists as reviewers in the AGS case
suggests that disciplinary representation is not sufficient
to guarantee consideration of potential risks to ecosystems.
Public Participation in the Analysis of Scientific
and Technical Information
Differences in the decision criteria used by government
bodies in the absence of definitive data could be related to
the active public participation.  EPA formally encouraged
participation but did not include the public in its internal
decisionmaking process.  CDFA did not encourage any public
participation.  Monterey County encouraged participation
formally, and included members of the public in their open,
hearing-centered decisionmaking process.  This process for
including the public in deliberations on the proposed AGS
field test could have contributed to Monterey County's
greater acceptance of circumstantial data from non-
scientific sources, and its more stringent decision criteria
on risk questions for which definitive scientific
information was not available.
Behind the rubric of public participation in the AGS
case is the work of an organized, public interest group
whose attention is directed almost soley to biotechnology
applications: the FET.  The everpresent FET instigated the
development of the very Interim Policy under which the
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proposal was regulated by EPA, identified key scientific
issues, encouraged the communication of members of the West
German Bundestag opposed to the proposed AGS test (and most
deliberate environmental releases of engineered microbes)
with the Monterey County Board of Supervisors, provided
information to the public and Monterey County, and
eventually uncovered evidence leading to EPA's Compliance
action against AGS.  More than the general public, the FET
defined the interdisciplinary scientific issues, and
directed EPA's action, as an antagonist in a chess match.
Through its actions, the FET directed the media's treatment
of the AGS field test application, and focussed the public's
attention on weak points in the EUP.
FET's apparent success in temporarily blocking the AGS
field test could not have occurred without the public
support of Concerned Citizens of Monterey County, the
informal coalition tree farmer Glenn Church founded
following CDFA's approval of the test proposal.  One reason
for Church's success in blocking the test was the assistance
of his politically savvy father, a former County Supervisor.
A second reason may be Monterey County's position as an
unofficial seat of New Age consciousness.  (Santa Cruz
Express, 1986) According to Fritjof Capra, a Monterey
county resident and author of The Tao of Physics. New Age
politics involves a reevaluation of the role of man in the
ecosystem and a respect for nature's balance.  This
perspective may have contributed to a distrust, at least
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among the liberal Monterey county populace, of EPA judgement
vis a vis protection of ecosystem integrity as well as human
safety.  Unlike the 1983 NIH University of California INA-
field test proposal case, FET's legal challenge to the AGS
EUP was unsuccessful.  This juxtaposition suggests that
FET's importance is primarily as an issue and information
source, powerful only when it has public support, rather
than as a powerful litigant without any constituency, as
some observers have contended.  Cffall Street Journal. 1986)
In a sense, the public, invited by Monterey County
government, acted as a science court.  Like a court, it
rendered a decision with the advice of experts but
independently, on the basis of classes of risks identified
in popular magazines, speculations by non-scientists, the
use of P. syringae to enhance artificial snowmeiking
operations, and other evidence that was inadmissable in more
august forums that considered only existing scientific
information.  Much like traditional juries, the apparent
forthrightness and trustworthiness of witnesses was weighed
heavily in the public's evaluation of their input.  AGS was
not viewed as trustworthy because it was not forthright in
disclosing information about the test to the public.  In
addition, AGS's apparently contradictory testimony on the
complex question of the identity of the genetically
engineered strains debased the currency of its other
arguments.  Many Monterey County opponents of the test did
not share the FET's moral opposition to genetic engineering
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or even environmental applications of biotechnology.  For
example, Monterey County journalist Jonathan Drake says,
"I think the use of genetic engineering will be
a boon to chemical manufacturing and
biomedicine...But I think that the AGS
application is potentially dangerous to the
ecology and is unnecessary.  Frost damage is not
a significant problem in the U.S." (Drake, 1986)
Monterey County's decision prevailed despite the
opposition of an influential, well supported industry, and
federal and state agencies who felt their authority could
not be preempted by any county.  One interpretation of this
unlikely outcome is that Monterey County and the general
public acted to assure that due process was taken in regard
to the evaluation of the risks from the first environmental
test of a viable GEM in the U.S.  While FIFRA analysis
fulfills the legal requirement for an environmental impact
statement or equivalent review to comply with NEPA (that
sunk the 1983 proposed Lindow and Panopolous experiment in
District Court Judge Sirica's court), it does not
necessarily fill society's expectation for a robust
environmental impact statement to support the first
deliberate application of viable, genetically engineered
microbes in the USA.  This argument is buttressed by the
fact that neither CDFA nor the US EPA has sued Monterey
County over its position on this case, despite the fact that
representatives of both EPA and CDFA publicly challenge
Monterey County's right to regulate tests of OEMs.
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EPA did not obtain the public approval of their process
and support of their position that Assistant Administrator
Moore identified as "crucial" to the success of the EPA
biotechnolgy regulation program.  CDFA has sxibsequently
altered its process for analyzing genetically engineered
pesticides to provide for special public notice in potential
host counties prior to issuance of future EUPs.  Local
approval of field tests is not required by CDFA.
Potential Conflict of Interest
In February 1986, on the basis of a hand typed
communication from a digruntled employee and at the
instigation of the FET, EPA began investigating the conduct
of AGS experiments in support of its EUP.  EPAs subsequent
evaluation of AGS experimental data revealed that relevant
experimental conditions were not accurately reported by AGS.
The verified allegation was that EUP support tests EPA
believed were conducted in indoor greenhouses were actually
conducted on the rooftop of AGS Oakland facility.  (EPA
Compliance Enforcement, 1986) AGS was initially fined
$20,000.  Following an invited negotiation with EPAs Office
of Special Counsel, the fine was reduced to $13,000 and the
charge of "falsification of data" was tempered.
AGS asserted that the level of containment of GEMs
injected in trees is higher than the containment achieved in
spraying GEMs inside a conventional greenhouse without
negative pressure or other controls.  Many scientists agree
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with this contention, although the practice of not reporting
the experimental site fully was deplored.  An important
technical problem with using trees on the rooftop is that
many experimental conditions relevant to the outcome of
colonization tests, such as level of moisture availeQ)le, can
be substantially different from the inside of a moist
greenhouse.
This enforcement action brought the potential for
conflicts of interest in doing experiments used in risk
assessments for environmental applications of biotechnology
to the fore.  While this enforcement action occurred after
EPA's first EUP decision, it suggests that alternative
institutional sources of experimental information may be
needed to avoid conflicts of interest in risk assessment
data reporting in the future.
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS
To resolve difficult new environmental conflicts, the
USA has frequently sought legislative solutions.  Many
issues raised in the AGS case are not amenable to solution
by legislative fiat.  Due to the diversity of environmental
biotechnology products and conditions, a unitary legislative
framework for environmental applications may not meike sense.
As FDA Special Assistant Henry Miller noted in a letter to
Science. a single enzyme produced by a single organism to
perform two applications in different environments requires
review by individuals or organizations with substantially
different expertise. (Miller, 1986)
Legislation can provide new standards for balancing the
risks and benefits of environmental applications of
biotechnology.  A broad public debate is needed to develop a
set of policy goals for environmental biotechnology
development.  Policy endpoints, identified in additional
legislation administered by different agencies, could
provide criteria for regulators to use in evaluating the
various impacts of diverse environmental biotechnology
applications on the environment.  Such legislation will not
reduce the magnitude of the uncertainties faced in ecosystem
function assessment nor the difficulties in determining the
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scientific significance of possible changes.  However,
legislation designed for environmental applications of
biotechnology could reflect the potential for impacts that
could not arise from historical environmental chemical
release.
Legislation can also vacate the present EPA policy of
separating risk management from risk assessment.  Cogent
regulation of future environmental applications of
biotechnology should more closely relate management
practices that are adopted for specific tests to the risks
that are identified and analyzed.  While legislation cannot
mandate management styles, this review of the AGS case
suggests that, at least for environmental applications of
GEMS, special care should be taken to manage risks that are
analyzed.
While the use of external data sources is suggested for
non routine decisions, special care should be taken to
assure the comprehensiveness and credibility of sources of
information used in evaluating environmental applications of
biotechnology.  Legislation could provide guidelines for the
use of corporate, university, and anecdotal sources of
information to evaluate new applications of biotechnology
for which there will probaibly be little information
published in peer reviewed journals.
A second recommendation is the development of a new,
biology-based conceptual framework for analyzing effects of
environmental applications of biotechnology.  The AGS case
showed that two of the three government organizations relied
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on chemical hazard assessment assumptions. The use of
interdisciplinary panels like the EPA FIFRA SAP Subpanel is
an important first step towards the goal of developing an
capability to analyze biological impacts of environmental
applications of biotechnology.  However, this case study
showed that existing boundaries of relevant academic
disciplines do not extend to cover many of the
transdisciplinary issues that emerged.  The development of a
hybrid science like predictive ecology, to supplement the
contributions of existing disciplines, is needed to address
issues that seem likely to recur in future environmental
biotechnology applications.  The development of this new
discipline, like the development of fields such as
neurolinguistics, may involve changes in both the types of
research questions asked and types of answers obtained.
Sustained financial and institutional support is needed to
obtain the participation of creative academics in addition
to the environmental consulting organizations that have been
responsible for much of the extant analysis of risks from
genetic engineered microorganisms.  In the long run,
developing a new conceptual scientific framework for
environmental biotechnology analysis may be more important
than new legislative criteria for decisionmaking, for this
framework will be used to frame the very questions that are
assessed in any review.
The task of risk analysis is a technical endeavor which
shares conceptual components with academic research, but has
106
different requirements.  In the analysis of the AGS EUP,
scenarios were developed and evaluated.  The role of
scenario generation is too important to current analysis of
environmental applications of biotechnology to be left to
litigants like the FET.  Regulatory agencies should be
responsible for the task of weaving together physically and
biologically plausible scenarios for each proposed
application.  Evaluation of such scenarios cannot rely on
expert opinion indefinitely; protocols for systematically
analyzing biological scenarios need to be developed.  (See
Appendix III for a discussion of requirements for usable
intermediate testing protocols.) Whatever approach is used
to evaluate adverse effect scenarios, technical risk
analysts should define decision criteria for evaluation
prior to undertaking experiments.  Based on the AGS case
analysis, it seems possible that this framework will be
based on qualitative characteristics of organisms and
ecosystems rather than quantitative parameters.  This could
have important implications for future risk management
practices.
The third recommendation is the support of research
elaborating biology based risk management practices for
environmental application of biotechnology.  In the AGS
case, Monterey County and the EPA only required the most
rudimentary physical control: siting.  CDFA required
chemical biocontrol methods that have clear limitations in
uncontrolled environments.  If the test was executed on
schedule and the product colonized a substantial area off
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site, (the first step in EPAs adverse effect scenario)
neither physical or chemical control method would suffice.
Successful control of the risks identified in risk analysis
is a logical requirement for management of future
environmental biotechnology applications.
Rather than relying on the accuracy of scientific
prediction at the frontiers of science, the engineering
principle of using conservative design to achieve safety
could be applied to environmental applications of
biotechnology.  As Kenneth Drezler points out in The Engines
of Creation, risks from new applications of molecular
biology are unlikely to be reduced by attempts to slow down
technological development because of the types of benefits
that are likely to accrue to society from certain
applications of biotechnology.  The design process, applied
to biotechnology products, would be a more appropriate phase
in which to incorporate concerns about ecosystem interaction
than the outdoor testing phase.  Potential risks from
eventual widespread deployment of environmental
biotechnology applications may be reduced by many orders of
magnitude by applying conservative judgement and
combinations of appropriately selected biological control
mechanisms.  The hierarchy of biocontrol mechanisms can be
integrated into plans for staged testing of enviornmental
applications of biotechnology.  Such an approach of course
depends on the willingness of both proposing and regulatory
organizations to use these to avoid future potential risks
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and liabilities.  On the basis of the uncertainties
identified in this report, the use of biology based control
regimens seem to provide the best technique for ameliorating
the unique risks of environmental applications of
biotechnology.
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY ANALYSTS
Interviewer #___________
Interview # ____________
(2)  Industry __Institution:  (1)  Govt. ______
(3)  Trade Assoc.
Position (1)  Policy Analyst __
(4)  P\iblic Int./Union
(2)  Sr. Decision Maker
Type of company  (1)  Pharmaceutical
(2) Processing natural resources or
agricultural products ___
(3) Manufacturing products ___
(4) Public utility ___        (5)  Other
INTRODUCTION:
As the letter and previous phone calls mentioned, the
University of North Carolina's Institute for Environmental
Studies and the School of Business Administration are conducting
a comparative study of the use of scientific and technological
information in making decisions in the federal government and
private industry.  The focus of the study is on non-routine
situations in which definitive scientific and technical
information is not availal)le and there isn't enough time to use
the normal procedures for gathering and analyzing data.  The
interview contains both closed and open-ended questions with
possibilities for comments throughout.  Please don't hesitate to
give your opinion.  Everything you say will be held in strict
confidence.  Results of the survey will be reported in aggregate
form and no identification of individuals will be made.
We have organized the interview questions into three
sections:
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First, the methods used for searching and gathering
information.
Second,the processes used to analyze or synthesize
information and
Third, the techniques used to present the analysis and
recommendations to senior decisionmakers.
SECTION I:  BACKGROUND ON AGENCY AND ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT
Before we start, I would like to get some information on the
agency and organizational unit in which you work.  If it is
available I would like to get a copy of the organizational chart
of your agency.
Q. B 1  When was the [INSERT AGENCY NAME] formed? ________
HAND RESPONDENT THE INDEX CARD PACKET WITH CARD 'A' ON TOP AND
EXPLAIN;__________________________________________________________
I am giving you a set of index cards which will be used in
answering some of the fixed choice questions.  Please use the
first card marked "A" to respond to the next question,
Q. B 2  How would you describe the primary role of the agency?*
RANKING IN TERMS OF
IMPORTANCE IF MORE THAN
ONE CATEGORY SELECTED
(1) administrative _____ ______
(2) regulatory    _____ _______
(3) research      _____ ______
(4) oversight     _____ ______
(5) consultative  _____ ______
*IF MORE THAN ONE CATEGORY, ASK:
How would you rank the categories you selected in terms of
importance?
ENTER RANKING IN SPACE PROVIDED TO THE RIGHT OF THE
CATEGORIES _____________________________
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Q. B 3 When was the [INSERT NAME OF DEPARTMENT OR DIVISION]
organized?
Q. B 4
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Q. B 5
How many people work in your unit?
1-5
5- 10
11--20
21--50
51--100
over 100
What is the primary academic background of people who
work in your unit?
Q. B 6 HOW would you describe the mission and the
key responsibilities of your unit?
Q. B 7 How would you describe your responsibilities in
the unit?
PROBE;  Could you please flip to index card "B."  If you had
to categorize your work, would you say the majority
of your time is spent in:
%
(1) administration
(2) research
(3) analysis
(4) communication
If the respondent suggests another category, please
ask them to specify their other categories.
(5)  other (specify)
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Q.   B  8  Whom does your  unit primarily  seirve?
PROBE;     Who  else  does   it   serve?
Q.   B  9     When a  decision has   to be made what   is   the  normal   chain
of   command?      tHAVE RE5P6Nt)filjy BRAw DIAGRAM,   IF 1
(neces^aRTT:—------------
Q. B 10 Who is the usual senior decision maker?
Name_______________________
Title _______________________
SECTION II:  DECISION BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Now I'd like you to select the most recent issue you analyzed
which you would characterize as involving a non-routine decision,
one that had to be made in a relatively short time period and in
which definitive scientific and technological information was not
available.  The issue you select will be used as the basis for
subsequent questions.  The time frame in which a decision had to
be made should be 3 to 6 months or less.
Q.  CI Could you please briefly describe the issue/situation?
PROBE;  Could you give the decision a label?
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Q.  C 2 At the start, how long were you given to do the analysis?
_____ days
_____ months
Q.  C 3 How long did it actually take to complete the analysis?
_____ days
_____ months
PROBE;  What were the key dates in terms of the start
and finish of the process?
STARTING DATE ______________
ENDING DATE
Q.  C 4 What was the stimulus for deciding to tackle the
particular issue (i.e. how did the issue come to be
perceived as warranting analysis, what were the main
forces that brought it to decisionmakers attention and
the need for resolution)?
(1) Press ________
(2) Congress ________
(3) From within agency ________
(4) From within unit ________
(5) Interest group ________
(6) Other (specify) ________
Q.  C 5 Please flip to index card "C." How important do you
think was the resolution of this issue to your agency
(company)?  [READ POSSIBLE ANSWERS yo RESPONDENTl
(1) not at all important
(2) not very important
(3) important
(4) very important
Q.  C 6 Who was the person or persons who defined the issue?
^^^^^^i^'S—
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Q.  C 7 Were alternative definitions of the issue considered?
*(1)  yes____
(2)  no____
*IF "YES":! What alternatives were considered?
Q.  C 8 Did others from your agency work with you on this
assignment?
*1.
2.
Yes
No
[*IF "YES":{ How did you organize internally to accomplish
the work?
Q.  C 9 Were other organizations involved in working on the same
issue?
*(1)
(2)
yes
no
*IF "YES":\ Which were the other organizations?
Q.  C 10 Could you please describe the chain of command formaking the final policy decision?  |.ASK PERSON TO DRAW i
DIAGRAM IF This SEEMfl HET.PWTLJ
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C 11 Who was the senior decisionmaker on this issue?
Name
Title
Q.  C 12 Please flip to index card "D."  How knowledgeable didyou consider yourself on this issue prior to this
analysis?  I'feEAb POSSIBLE ANSWERS TO RESI^HDENT'J
(1) not knowledgeable at all
(2) slightly knowledgeable
(3) knowledgeable
(4) very knowledgeable
(5) expert
Q.  C 13 Did you have information on hand when you started to do
the analysis?
* (1)  yes ____
{2)  no ____
[*IF "YES";t Could you please describe what the information
was?
Q.  C 14 At the start of the process what types of informationappeared to have the most potential for being
questionable?
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II.  SEARCH
Now I'm going to ask you questions on how you conducted your
search for the scientific and technological information that you
used in your policy analysis, focusing both on the source or
sources of information and the form in which you gathered the
information.
THE NEXT THREE QUESTIONS (SI, S2, S3) ARE TO BE RECORDED ON THE
CHART BELOW.  THE QUESTIONS ARE TO BE REPEATED UNTIL YOU EXHAUST
THE SEARCH PROCESS.  AFTER YOU HAVE ASKED ABOUT THE 'FIRST'
SOURCE THEY TURNED TO, THE FORM IN WHICH THE INFORMATION CAME AND
THE REASON FOR CHOOSING THAT PARTICULAR SOURCE, PROCEDE TO ASK
ABOUT THE SECOND SOURCE THEY TURNED TO, THE FORM, REASON, THEN GO
TO THE THIRD SOURCE ETC.
ASK RESPONDENT TO FLIP TO CARD E AND TELL THEM THEY WILL
USE IT TO ANSWER A QUESTION ABOUT THE FORM IN WHICH THE
INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED. _______
Q.  SI  Where did you turn to first in your search for the
necessary scientific and technological information?
Q.  S2  How did you obtain the information! ("Remind them to look)
on CARD E)
2.
1. Face-to-face
2. Telephone
3. Personal documents such as letters or memos
4. Formal written documents
5. Numeric documents
6. Other (please specify)
Q.  S3  Why did you turn to
Source
(Q»si)
^_S2. etc.)?
Form
(Q.S2)
Reason Selected
(Q.S3)
(name source ST
Usefulness
(Q,S4)
3.
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Source
(O.Sl)
Form
(0.S2)
Reason Selected
(0.S3)
Usefulness
(0.S4)
4-
0.   S4
0-   S5
Would you please   turn  to  Card F-      I would like you  to
describe  the usefulness of  each source  of   information youused.      rSO  THROtIGH THE LTflT flff  j^jftURCRS  and wpttr  thf.----------
RANKING   IN   THE  LAST   COLUMN  ON   THE   ABOVK   CHART. P'  Did you"
£ind very useful     somewhat  useful     not very
useful,   not  useful  at all?
1- Vei-y useful
2 Somewhat  useful
3 Not very useful
4 Not useful at all
9-  D.K.. N R  (this is not on their card)
Could you please flip to Card G.  [ASK:1  What was the
extent of involvement of the senior decisionmaker in the
search process?
1 Worked as team member
2 Monitored information gathering
3 Provided tips on possible sources
4 -  Not involved
5 Other
v«36  What other sources of S&T information would you anticipate
that your decisionmaker "client" would consult or would
gain access to him or her?
12 8
O. S7  Did the educational background or personal characteristics
of the persons who would be making the decision influence
where you went for information?
*1.  Yes
2   No
1*TF "YES" J How did the decisionmaker' s backgro\ind
influence where you went for S&t information?
O. S8  Were there statutory or legal reauirements that you had to
meet in acquiring information?
*1
2
Yes
No
1*TF "YES" What were the statutory or legal reauirements?
o. SQ  Was the gathering of information influenced by
organizational uncertainties such as (Please flip to CARD
H)?
1-  Differences in values and perspectives
2 Conflicts over who would make important decisions
3 Uncertainty over the willingness of actors to
cooperate
4 Lack of precedent for handling such situations
5-  Ambiguity in mission or objectives
6  Other
0. SI 0 Were there political pressures that influenced the
gathering of information?
*1
2
Yes
No
[*IF "YES";j What were the pressures?
O. Sll  Ts this the typical search pattern that you use in
situations when time is short and data unavailable?
1
*2
Yes
No
*TF "NO":  What made it atypical?
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III.  ANALYSIS
using the same case as before, I'd like to focus how you analyzedthe information you gathered and how you drew conclusions.
Q. Al   In the process of gathering the information did youencounter information which could be characterized as
being uncertain?
*1.  Yes ____
2.  No
(*IF "YES";! Please flip to Card I [ASK:]  What was thenature of the uncertainty? Was it due to
1. Uncertainty resulting from different assumptions____2. Uncertainty resulting from conflicting data_____3. Uncertainty resulting from different models_____4. Uncertainty resulting frcan different interpretations
of the same information ____
5. Other
IrESPondent may pick more Than one At^swen
PROBE;  How did you resolve the questions of uncertainty?
Q. A2   In the process of conducting your analysis did you use
any formal analytic techniques?
*Yes _____
NO
|*^IF "YES"; I What techniques did you use?
I*IF "YES^O In retrospect how effective were these
techniques?
I*IF "YES";1 Did you use any particular computer software?
1. Yes
2. No
l*IF   "YES"T\   What  software did you use?
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Q. A4   How many professionals worked on the analysis?
[TVJ^'m'  THAR o;NE^ .. ASKj J
Were any from outside your shop?
*Yes
No
*IF   "YES":"J   Where  were   they   from?
Q. A5 [IF MORE THAl-J ONE PERSON "WORKED ON THE ANALYSIS ASKjRESPONDENT TO FLIP TQ CARD J, ASK : 1.........________—J
Row were differences among the teairi members resolved in
preparing the report?
1. Consensus
2. Majority rule without vote
3. Majority vote
4. Dominant individual
5. Referred to supervisor (s)
6. other Specify
Q. A6   Were differing opinions of other groups who were not
included on the team represented in the analysis
presentation?
*1.
2.
Yes
No
I*IP "YES" ;'} HOW were they included?
Q. A7   Who or what groups reviewed the analysis and its
recommendations before they were presented to the senior
decisionmaker?
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Q. A8   Could you please flip to Card K.  What was the extent ofinvolvement the senior decisionmaker in the analysis and
drawing of conclusions?
1.  Worked as part of the team ____
2. Reviewed the analysis and conclusions
3. Not Involved
Q. AS   Were there political pressures from any other group that
influenced the drawing of conclusions?
*1)
2)
Yes
No
*IF "YES" What were the political pressures and from
whom?
Q. AlO  Is this the typical pattern of analysis you would use in
other non-routine decisions?
1.  Yes
*2.  No
*IF "NO"V{ What made it atypical?
IV.  PRESENTATION
NOW I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU QUESTIONS WHICH FOCUS ON THE ACTUALPRESENTATION OF S&T INFORMATION TO THE SENIOR DECISIONMAKER(S)
Q. PI   How did you present the information to the senior
decisionmaker?
Q. P2   Do you have a standard reporting format that you use?
*1.
2.
Yes
No
r*iF~"YE£:" : I What is your standard reporting format?
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Q. P3   Have you found any one method of presenting S&T
information more successful than others?
Q. P4   How did the educational background and the preferences of
decision maker influence the way you presented the S&T
information?
P5   Did the senior dec:" sionitiaker want a detailed presentation
of different options or a single recommendation?
1.  Different options  ____
2.  Single Recommendation
P6   How did you present scenarios which had elements of
uncertainty?
1. Worst case?  ___
2. Most likely? ___
3. Best estimates?
4. other
PROBE;  Have you found any technique more successful than
others in conveying the type and extent of
uncertainty in scientific and technological
information?
P7   How did you present decision options? I CARD L)
1. Consensus recommendation of the staff _
2. Alternative interpretations with arguments
for and against each _
3. Majority recommendation, with minority views
noted _
4. Majority   recommendation,   with  formal
r.iinority   report _
5. Other,    specify _
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Q. P8   Did you use computer graphics?
*1.  Yes
2.  No
ttllf "yes"; I Were they color?
ͣ<llf "yes":f How effective are they in communicating?
Q.P 9  How influential do you feel that the scientific and
technological information was in the final decision?
Please flip to CARD M.  Was it:
1. Extremely influential
2. Moderately influential
3. Slightly influential
4. Not influential at all
9.  D.K. , N.R.
Iprobe reasons for ans\\^er'::j
V.  GENERAL QUESTIONS """"^^
I am going to ask you a few general questions.
Gl  In general, do you feel that science or technological
information changes policy makers minds?
1.  Yes  _____
•? .  No  _____
3.  Mixed
9.  D.K., N.R.
G2  In your experience, do the senior decisionmakers understandthe science or technical information that underpins policy?
Please look at Card N.  Would you say that most senior
decisionmakers,
1. a good understanding
2. a basic understanding
3. a minimal understanding
4. don't really understand scientific and technological
information
G3  If you were to advise a young new policy analyst of theskills they need to deal with non-routine policy decisions
with scientific and technological components, what skills
would you recommend they learn?
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VI.  BIOGRAPHICAL
I'D LIKE TO END THE INTERVIEW BY ASKING YOU SOME BACKGOUND
QUESTIONS.
VI.  Could you sketch your education for me, including college
majors and degrees
FOR UNDERGRADUATE DEGREES:  IF ANSWERED WITH A UNIVERSITY BESURE TO ASK WHICH COLLEGE _________
College Dates Degree    I4aj or
V2.  How long have your worked at your current job?
V3.  Could you please sketch your previous employment history,including where you worked, for how long and a general idea
of what your job entailed?
Employer Dates Job Responsibilities
V4.  Do you consider yourself a federal career employee?
1. Yes___
2. No
V5.  In what year were you born?
V6.. What is your GS level? ____
APPENDIX II
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND FOR THE ACS CASE
Technology
In addition to catalyzing to a quantum leap in man's
qualitative understanding of biological systems, modern
biotechnology permits exponential quantitative decreases in
the time it takes to accomplish tasks of conventional
applied genetics.  Not only a new research tool, modern
biotechnology can also be viewed as an extension of
historical methods of genetic control and selection used in
many commercial processes like fermentation and animal
breeding.  Striking success in bacterial genetics research
suggests that some genes with special properties can now be
added to the normal coterie of functions to add special
functionality to bacteria for ambient environment
applications.  (Office of Technology Assessment, 1981)
As a result of both scientific and technological
advances, many companies have been formed to commercialize
new processes for making existing products and to develop
entirely new products for many industries.  Diverse
environmental applications targeted by US biotechnology
companies include plants breeding, microbial pesticides,
microbial fertilizers, metal mining enhancers, waste
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processing, artificial snowmaking, silvaculture, and
polymers materials.
While many product concepts have emerged since the
advent of biotechnology, substantially more effort is needed
to produce a commercially viable product than simple
introduction of a viable gene for the functional product
into a convenient vector.  The challenge of obtaining
overexpression of introduced genes in nev organisms has
revealed a variety of organismal control mechanisms.  In
many cases, years of research are needed to determine what
factors are responsible for controlling functional
expression of new genes.
B.  The Technical Basis for the AGS FROSTBAN Product:
Pseudomonas fluorescens and Pseudomonas syringae
Pseudomonas fluorescens and Psueodmonas syringae are two
of over fifty distinct strains of the diverse bacterial
genus Pseudomonas.  Members of this genus are found in the
air, water, as well as on plants and animals.  Pseudomonads
are 1.5 to 4 micrometers long and 0.5 to 1.0 micrometers
wide, and appear to be shaped like slightly curved rods
under the microscope. (Clarke, 1980) Pseudomonas as a genus
are most notable for their ability to utilize a wide
variety of substances (including nitrate and hydrogen gas)
as energy sources.  Some individual strains that live in
human, animal, or plant hosts can cause the hosts some
deleterious effects.  Accordingly, these have been
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classified as opportunistic human pathogens and as specific
plant pathogens.
Historically, pseudomonas have not received the rich
attention that model species such as Escherichia coli and
Sacchromyces yeast have received.  This is in part due to
the arbitrary choice of certain species for the first
rigorous molecular analysis in the early 1970s.  Also, many
methods for studying bacterial genetics require cloning
experiments that were only permitted in specially
constructed "safe" E. coli systems in the mid 1970s.  One
strain of Pseudomonas has received a good deal of attention
because of its apparent clinical importance: Pseudomonas
aeroginosa.  This strain is an opportunistic pathogen that
is often isolated from secondary infections of burn victims
in hospitals.  It is particularly bothersome because it has
or can acquire resistance to most therapeutic antibiotics
available. (Clarke, 1980)
In the 1980s, psuedomonads have received much more
attention for a variety of reasons.  First, their ubiquity
in soil, water, and air, has made them candidates for
environmental application products that can now be
envisioned.  Zaugg and Swarz (1982) suggest that
Pseudomonas, Acinetobactor, and Flavobacteria will be the
most used genera in the chemical industry, while
Thiobacillus, Leptospirillum, and Sulfolobus may be used by
the mining industry to promote leaching of valuable
minerals.  (OTA, 1981) The NIH restrictions on use of
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naturally occurring bacterial hosts for recombinant DNA
experiments were lifted in the revised 1978 NIH Points to
Consider Notice. (Milewski, 1985) Finally, biochemists and
molecular biologists have become interested in expanding the
knowledge of non fermentative, aerobic metabolism and multi-
substrate catabolism that many Pseudomonads perform.
(Clarke, 1980)
The ACS FROSTBAN product is a mixture of deletion
mutants of two bacteria, Pseudomonas syringae and
Pseudomonas fluorescens).  In temperate climates,
Pseudomonas syringae and Ervina herblcola are two of the
leading bacteria that inhabit the leaves of plants.
Pseudomonas fluorescens is primarily found in the soil
associated with plants.  Pseudomonas syringae is not
considered a human pathogen.  Plant pathologists have
described pathogenic relationships that some strains of P.
syringae has with certain types of fruit trees.
Phytopathogenic pseudomonads such as P. syringae generally
have relatively narrow host ranges.  The appearance of
Pseudomonas infections varies depending on the host tree and
bacterial strain.  They often have the appearance of dark,
inploded soft spots on bark tissue. (Mount, 1980)
Apparently, P. fluorescens. P. syringae. Erwina
herbicola and perhaps other bacteria secrete a lipoprotein
from their cell wall onto the surfaces of plants.
Lipoproteins are protein molecules with a hydrophobic lipid
component.  Lipids are the basis of fats, which naturally
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repel water.  Groups of water molecules on the plant surface
are induced to align themselves with one another in a
crystalline formation in the presence of this protein.  This
induced alignment of water molecules can drastically reduce
the time necessary for a given amount of water to turn to
ice at a given temperature.  Without sites that catalyze
nucleation, water can exist at temperatures below 0 degrees
Celsius in a supercooled state for a long time.  In addition
to bacteria that secrete lipoproteins, other agents
including chemicals, dust, and pollen can act as ice
nucleation centers.  However, the rate at which ice is
formed on a given surface seems to depends on the ice
nucleating (INA+) agent that is active at the highest
temperature.  The most efficient ice nucleating agents at
temperatures just below thermodynamic freezing (0 degrees
Celsius) known are strains of P. syringae such as £.
syringae pathovar syringae.
A certain percentage of naturally occurring Pseudomonads
do not secrete this ice-nucleating (INA+) protein.  (Lindow,
1979) The temperature at which frost forms on outdoor plant
leaves with a given ambient concentration of water vapor
depends on the number of nuclei that are formed by E.
herbicola and p. syringae and secreting that protein on the
leaf surfaces.
Lindow hypothesized that application of a mist of
bacteria that are selected for their ability to secrete the
INA protein would increase the rate at which ice crystals
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are formed on plants. Conversely, the highest temperature at
which frost forms on the leaf surface could be lowered if
INA+ bacteria were killed or displaced by a mist of INA-
bacteria sprayed on the plant.  Subsequent experiments using
E. herbicola isolates on corn in growth chambers and in the
field bore out this hypothesis.  (Lindow 1978)
Lindow, the son of an Oregon farmer, realized the
potential capability of this experimental technique to
provide frost protection for growing plants.  Subsequently,
using a simple bacterial screening technique, Lindow
prepared a mist of INA- pseudomonas syringae and P.
fluorsescens and sprayed it on corn plants to test its
ability to control frost formation outdoors.  The INA-
strains colonized the surface of the plant leaves and
lowered the de facto frost formation temperature by 2-3
degrees centigrade.  (Lindow, 1984)
Subsequent research by Lindow's colleagues at the
University of California at Berkeley established that a
small, 256 base pair gene codes for the INA protein.
Disruption of the ice nucleation (INA) protein gene results
in INA- Pseudomonads.  It is not clear whether naturally
occurring INA- bacteria do not produce the INA protein, form
an inactive ice nucleation lipoprotein, or simply fail to
secrete it onto plant surfaces where it can provide a
nucleus for frost formation.  (Orser, 1980)
Established genetic engineering techniques permitted
this gene to be deleted from the genome of the INA+ £.
syringae.  When the 266 base pair gene is deleted, the
potential for the bacteria to revert is reduced
dramatically.  Instead of requiring a mere single base pair
change to stop secretion of an active INA protein, a more
unlikely simultaneous change of thousands of base pairs
would have to occur to cause phenotypic reversion to INA+
now.  Since the daughters of engineered INA- cells would not
have the genetic material that codes for this protein, its
recurrence would be extremely unlikely.  Rather than arising
from background rates of random mutation, functional INA
reversion with the genetically engineered INA- deletion
mutant would now be virtually impossible without entrance of
exogenous viral or bacterial DNA containing a gene for a
similar protein, or strong selection pressures over a number
of generations. (Colwell, 1985)
Since the genetic modification is a deletion of a
unitary segment of bacterial DNA, the product is much
simpler to construct than many genetically engineered
organisms.  Because no extracellular genetic material is
incorporated into the Pseudomonads' genome, the likelihood
of the manipulation resulting in a completely dysfunctional
bacteria is low.  In contrast to most biotechnology
products, FROSTBAN requires that the gene of interest, the
gene that codes for the ice nucleation lipoprotein, not be
expressed for the application.  Accordingly, the technical
barriers to producing it seem quite modest.
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Application of FROSTBAN is intended to reduce frost
damage in annual commercial agricultural plants.  The most
widely used current method of preventing frost damage are
relatively ineffective smudge pots that burn at night to
raise the temperature of fields at marginal frost
temperatures.  Since FROSTBAN does not rely on changing the
ambient temperature but rather on displacing plant surface
microflora that serve as nuclei for ice nuclei formation at
near freezing temperatures, FROSTBAN would represent a novel
technological approach to agricultural frost protection.
While there are some conventionally selected bacterial
preparations used to kill other plant pests, FROSTBAN would
be among the first agricultural product intended to
extinguish a nonpathogenic functions of native bacteria.
For this reason, FROSTBAN's method of action can be
considered novel. While there are a host of companies that
provide inputs to the plant agricultural process, this
application is not a cultivar nor a pesticide, nor a
chemical fertilizer.  As such, it is an early example of a
potential biotechnology product that provides a new
commercial function in an existing market sector.
From the successful production of INA~ clones on, work
on the FROSTBAN product can be considered development rather
than research on a technical activity spectrum ranging from
basic research to applied research to development, to pilot
scale demonstration to commercial scale demonstration to to
commercial use.  In the US, there is a tradition of
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companies picking up product ideas after the universities
have shown the feasibility of a product concept in research
situations.  It is in the context of development and pilot
scale demonstration activities, rather than as either pure
or applied research, that the AGS proposal to field test
genetically engineered INA- P. syrlngae should be
considered.
Appendix III
Underlying Scientific and Technical Issues that
Arose in Evaluation of the AGS EUP
The AGS EUP review process may be viewed as a window on
both scientific and technical issues that are likely to
recur in future analyses of environmental biotechnology
applications.  Some of these scientific and technical issues
are discussed below.
A.  Are Impacts Dependent on the Initial Dose?
As suggested earlier, the threshold dose concept that is
central to toxicological risk analysis of chemical hazards
was assumed in EPA's analysis.  In contrast, CDFA seemed to
generally assume a digital, threat/no threat concept that is
characteristic of microbiological analysis.  In its analysis
of the AGS transportation permits, CDFA did not assume any
adverse effects would exhibit quantitative, dose-related
thresholds.  Monterey County seemed to assume a threshold
based concept of risks from the test, albeit with a
different decision point on the theoretical dose response
curve than EPA apparently had.  Accordingly, the Monterey
County Board of Supervisors initially indicated to AGS that
a mutually defined test site remote from the population
centers of the county could be acceptable.  Apart from the
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potential merits of utilizing a quantitative threshold
assumption in specific atmospheric or plant pathogenesis
contexts, the assumption that risk can be limited by the
absolute quantity of the organisms that are applied is
oblivious to the reported capacity of bacteria and viruses
to reproduce exponentially from literally undetectable
numbers if conditions become favorable for their growth.
(Alexander, 1985)
B.  Will horizontal transfer of genetic material alter
environmental function of GEM or native organisms?
None of the regulatory arms of the organizations we
surveyed considered possible impacts resulting from
uncontrolled, probabilistic transfer of genetic material
from the GEM to naturally occurring microflora or from
related bacterial taxa to the GEM population.  The ability
of living organisms to transfer genetic material also
confers the potential for an organisms functional properties
to change substantially.  The rates of transfer of genetic
material from one species to another are quite low but
quantitatively estimated for many types of possible crosses.
(Strauss) As long as there are no limitations on the time
that the GEMs will remain in the environment, risk
assessments should assume some genetic transfer will take
place as a result of the reproductive capabilities of normal
microorganisms.  Potential hazards could result from
incorporation of elements of extant environmental genes or
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from contribution of introduced genes into existing
ecosystems that can alter the functional abilities of the
introduced GEM in a new environment.
Identity of Genetically Engineered Microorganisms
The relationship between the identity of the AGS INA-
GEM, its parents, and naturally occurring INA- bacteria is
somewhat more subtle than the summaries of each reviewing
organization given in Table 11 suggest.  In an SAP Subpanel
meeting, Robert Colwell noted,
"the chemical mutagens (INA- bacteria obtained
by a process of chemical mutagenesis of INA+
parents and selection for INA- daughters) are
not as effective at repressing the nucleation of
ice as the (genetically engineered) deletion
mutants.  They are not in other words identical
in their phenotype even regarding the ice-minus
characteristic (for which they were selected)."
(Colwell, 1985)
Historically, bacteria have been identified and
classified on the basis of their observable characteristics,
or phenotype. More recently, molecular biology has developed
techniques for experimentally, directly assessing the
genetic content of bacteria.  As a result, another basis for
determining the identify and classifying bacteria is
available.  Some traditional classifications of bacteria
have been thrown in disarray by the use of modern genetic
analysis.  Moreover, the relative importance of genetic
composition in relation to observable, functional
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characteristics of bacteria is a matter of controversy among
bacteriologists.
An alternative to using the visible INA function as an
indicator of the identity of AGS' GEM is the use
physiological comparison tests such as those reqpiested by
CDFA to compare biochemical functions of GEMs and parents.
There was no imputed relationship between INA function and
these biochemical functions.  In the AGS case, CDFA reported
that the GEM had the same response pattern to a battery of
biochemical and physiological tests as the INA+ parents of
AGS' GEM.  A potential problem with using physiology tests
as an indicator of similarity of GEMs to their parents is
the question of how to evaluate the significance of
differences that are found between responses of other GEMs
and their parents to physiological test batteries.  The
implicit criterion used in the AGS case by CDFA, that the
more similar the GEM is to the parent, the better its
behavior can be modelled by the parent, may not be useful if
the genetically engineered trait's are novel or independent
of the functions assessed in the physiological test battery.
These problem will be exacerbated when organisms that are
more different from predecessors than AGS' bacteria are from
wild type P. fluorescens and syringae.
C.  Competition and Ecosystem Function Evaluation
SAP Subpanel member Susan Hirano suggested that the
question of whether the AGS organism is considered novel or
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natural may not make a difference in evaluating the
potential risks posed by its introduction into given
ecosystems.  The question of how to evaluate risks from new
organisms in a given ecosystem, whether genetically
engineered, the result of naturally occurring recombinatory
processes, or physical transport, is affected by the other
participants in a target ecosystem as much as by the
identity of introduced organisms of any sort. (Hirano, 1985)
Competition between AGS' INA- GEM and natural microflora
was a key issue in EPA and Monterey County analyses.  As
noted previously, a variety of alternative and alterable
competitive balances can be expected to result from future
GEM introductions. Evaluating the likelihood of these
outcome profiles on the basis of indoor greenhouse tests and
current theory is problematic.
Current theory suggests that microbial competition is
affected by a variety of environmental conditions including
the presence of water, heat stress, organic molecules, other
microbes, and many other factors.  The competitive balance
between microbes may be drastically different on two sides
2Of a 1 cm soil sample.  Accordingly, knowledge of
environmental conditions seems critical to any effort to
predict microbial competition.
Determining what events would constitute an ecological
dislocation if offsite colonization occurs is a thorny
question that was not explicitly tackled in any evaluation
of the AGS field test.  For example, changes in
150
precipitation patterns were viewed as an adverse effect, but
no standard was developed to determine when the atmospheric
ecology was substantially changed, or changed enough to
cause a terrestrial ecological dislocation.  An illustrative
standard could be, "a dislocation occurs if the percentage
of INA+ bacteria in low lying rainclouds would be reduced by
a factor of 5 or more following application of an INA- mist
on 100 acres of fields underneath the atmospheric
experimental area."  Determining ecological dislocation with
such criteria requires development of goals for ecosystem
integrity.  These goals in turn depend on current knowledge
about ecosystem function and current thought about the role
of man in ecosystems.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) set one
legal standard for ecological dislocation: prevention of
species extinction.  The ecology literature has recently
provided suggestions that intact ecosystem function can be
evaluated in terms of continuance of microbial nutrient
cycling processes, community membership stability, and
impact on higher trophic levels.  (Cairns, 1986)
Ecological risk assessment for future environmental
applications of biotechnology will require the refinement
and comparison of ecosystem integrity indicators from these
alternate conceptions of intact ecosystem function.
Evaluating the significance of disruptions to existing
ecosystems is likely to remain a perplexing problem because
some elements of natural environments and human society are
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likely to gain and others to lose from different types of
environmental biotechnology mediated ecosystem alteration.
Two competing lenses through which to view the
ecological consequences of EBA introduction have been
introduced in the scientific literature.  Winston Brill,
Director of Research for Agracetus, has suggested that the
most appropriate lens through which to view the introduction
of environmental applications of biotechnology is the lens
of commercial agriculture.  For hundreds of years, man's
knowledge of genetics has been harnessed to introduce
literally thousands of new varieties of plants and animals.
These changes have been accomplished, with isolated
exceptions, without wreaking wholesale ecological damage.
Thus, the introduction of genetically engineered microbial
pesticides can be modelled by examining the impact of
introducing large quantities of conventionally selected
microbial pesticides into agricultural environments.  In the
absence of reports of significant ecological disruption from
such analagous introductions of new species into a variety
of man made environments, one could conclude that similar
introductions of genetically engineered microbes, plants, or
animals would not present a threat to continued ecosystem
function.
Frances Sharpless, an ecologist at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, suggests that a better lens through which to
view the ecological consequences of environmental
biotechnology introductions is the history of the
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inadvertant spread of natural organisms brought to new
environments. She notes that man has served an unwitting
vector for many pests that have hurt economically important
plants (e.g., chestnut blight) and created ecological
nuisances (e.g., the gypsy moth, Kudzu vine, and cockroach).
While she agrees that only a fraction of immigrating species
produce ecological dislocation, she does not believe that
available ecological theory permits prediction of what new
species or new traits are most likely to penetrate existing
biotic assemblages and cause ecological dislocation.  She
suggests that "stressed or simplified environments (such as
commercial monoculture agriculture) are more vulnerable to
successful invasion."(Sharpless, 1982)
D.  Technical Requirements for Monitoring and Control
EPA required AGS to monitor the soil, insects and plants
in the vicinity of the test site for the presence of GEMs.
In order to develop its capabilities for aerial monitoring,
EPA's ORD planned to conduct aerial monitoring during the
field test.  In the AGS case, Steven Lindow had already
developed a simple, efficient protocol for determining the
level of INA+ bacteria on natural surfaces.  The development
of equally sensitive assays for presence of GEMs on the
basis of their genetic content is a current EPA research
priority.  The utility of monitoring GEM presence in the
environment for scientific research in early field tests
like the AGS proposal is obvious.  However, the regulatory
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utility of a well developed monitoring capability without a
concomitant ability to control the environmental behavior of
the GEM and/or its genes seems questionable.  Control
technology options received less attention in EPA and
Monterey than in CDFA.
In contrast to EPA, CDFA did not require monitoring but
did require simple physical and chemical controls.  The
physical controls included respirators and personal
protective equipment to prevent overexposure to the AGS
technicians during application.  The chemical controls were
antibacterial chemicals designed to kill bacteria on
equipment used in the field test and on the test plot in the
event an unanticipated outcome occurred. The requirement of
personal protective equipment for applicators was cited as a
cause of concern by both Monterey County citizens and
Monterey County decisionmakers.
Technical controls for OEMs can be profitably divided
into three classes with different properties: physical,
chemical, and biological.  Physical controls range from
selection of sites remote from major population centers to
use of negative pressure greenhouses or tents to contain
OEMs.  EPAs site selection requirement was a physical
control, though it was not closely tied to its scientific
risk analysis.  CDFAs personal protective equipment
requirement was also a physical control.  CDFA's proposed
use of chemical bactericides to control possible offsite
colonization is an example of chemical controls.  Biological
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controls for GEMs range from the presence of competing
naturally occurring organisms to the selection of organisms
with temperature ranges that restrict their growth potential
in a given environment to the engineering of test organisms.
For plants, biological controls include excision or covering
of sexual parts of plants, and the use of species that do
not cross pollinate.  AGS said that competition with wild
type Pseudomonads was a natural biological control on the
proposed FROSTBAN experiment.  No other biological controls
were mentioned in the analyses of the AGS case.  The types
of controls required in the AGS case are shown in Table 18.
Table 18
Controls Required for Execution of AGS Field Test
Organization Type of Control Required
Physical     Chemical    Biological
EPA Siting        -— ---
CDFA - Protective
Gear        Bactericides    ---
MC Siting        —-
Physical controls were the preeminent class of control
in regulatory decisions on the AGS field test proposal.
Chemical controls were only detailed by one organization.
Biological controls, except for natural competition with
native microflora, were not required by any of the three
organizations.
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Physical controls seem best suited to control of large
animals and plants.  The use of any chemical control for
controlling microbial reproduction seems less likely to
provide long term protection from novel bacterial strains
than animals or plants because of the adaptive ability and
rapid reproductive rates of bacteria.  Biological controls,
including genetic engineering seem to have the greatest
potential for controlling undesired GEM activity.
The engineering principle of minimizing risks through
design conservatism could be applied to both environmental
biotechnology experiments and commercial applications.  Even
if certain risks cannot be quantitatively analyzed in
advance of a field test, they may be reduced by application
of appropriate control technologies. (Drexler, 1986)
Artificial biological controls were used in conjunction with
both chemical and physical controls to ameliorate unknown
potential risks from escape of errant genetic engineering
projects from labs in the mid 1970s.
A strategy for minimizing risks from early environmental
applications of biotechnology could employ a variety of
biological controls to reduce the potential risk of such
applications by many orders of magnitude.  A first tier
control could involve selection of test organisms.  Early
experiments could use animals that have extensive physical
barriers to extra-species gene transfer to examine impacts
of new genes on ecosystem dynamics.  Plants have a lower
level of genetic stability than animals, however, they are
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still orders of magnitude more stable than bacteria.  Among
bacteria, certain genera have shared fewer genes with other
species over the eons. Transposable elements of DNA called
plasmids are necessary for much interspecies bacterial sex.
Certain species bear less mobile plasmids or none at all
under most conditions. Pseudomonads bear plasmids and
chemical antibiotic resistance has been demonstrated to be
borne on plasmids for one species of Pseudomonas.  Use of
this tier of biocontrol would have eliminated the AGS strain
from consideration and prioritized other genera for early
deliberate environmental experiments with OEMs.
A second tier of control of environmental applications
of biotechnology could involve the growth requirements for
OEMs. OEMs could be developed from species with narrower,
more specific growth requirements, so that the likelihood of
their colonization in a given set of environmental
conditions would be lower than a generalist organism more
suited to those conditions.  One analogy for this type of
control is the introduction of tropical plants into
temperate agriculture.  These plants, because they could not
survive the temperature fluctuations of temperate climates,
should be more controllable as a result of their higher
temperature requirement.  (Pinmental, 1987)
A third tier of biological control could feature
modifications of the GEMs themselves including use of
genetic engineering techniques. Genetic engineering can be
used to locate potentially deleterious genes on stable parts
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of the nuclear genome rather than on more mobile plasmids.
Genes for both sexual and asexual genetic transfer can be
removed from GEMs, thus decreasing the probability of
transmission of genetic material from the GEM to other
organisms.  Unique physical or nutritional requirements can
be given to GEMs designed for field use.  For example, the
provision of an synthetic organic chemical without many
natural structural analogs could be required for an
environmental GEM to function.  The extent of the GEM
application could then be limited by the extent of the
provision of the special chemical nutrient.  Finally,
irradiation of bacteria can prevent them from reproducing.
While it seems impractical to irradiate a field of
indeterminate size to control reproduction of GEMs, prior
irradiation of bacteria to prevent reproductive explosion on
release could work for some applications if the function is
not debilitated by this process.  AGS irradiates its
conventionally selected INA+ P. syringae SNOMAX product to
control offsite replication.  While most of these third tier
control mechanisms would reduce the viability of the GEM in
natural ecosystems, they could provide additional assurance
that risks are controllable in the early years of
environmental biotechnology. (Strauss, 1985)
While biological controls have the promise of mitigating
some ecological risks of proposed environmental
biotechnology applications, complex problems relating to the
integration of such controls with the functional and market
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needs of environmental biotechnology applications need to be
resolved for this approach to be used widely by commercial
entities.
